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* Lecturer in Law, Faculty of Law, University Hong Kong. Since presenting the original paper
at Duke University in 1987 1 have begun to explore the implications of theories of legal evolution and
transplanting for Chinese legal borrowings. I hope to show that the experience in Chinese civil law
sheds light on theories of legal transplanting and heritability of law in general but this would have
required a complete re-writing of the paper. Instead, apart from the addition of an afterword, this
article is substantially the same as the original paper. I would therefore welcome any comment and
criticisms which will assist me in this new undertaking.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
ABSTRACT
China's General Principles of Civil Law ("General Principles") is not just a piece
of legislation; it represents a system of legal relations with an underlying
theoretical framework. Despite any "Chinese characteristics" that might be
found elsewhere in the General Principles, its theoretical framework is firmly
rooted in the Romanist legal tradition as interpreted by the Pandectists and
borrowed from them by Japan and China before 1949. This is amply
illustrated by the definition of property rights in chapter 5, section 1.
Parts II and III of this article examine the theoretical tools used by
Chinese civil law theorists to draft and analyze these property rights, the
system and legal attributes of ownership, and five kinds of "rights in things."
The latter are a kind of right in ren. Four of these rights are designed to
ensure that the rights to use and realize the economic potential of publicly
owned property are distributed to productive economic entities, such as
collective or state enterprises and individuals or household economic units.
Despite an attempt by legal theorists in the 1950's to shake off the mantle of
"bourgeois" legal concepts, the theoretical system used to define these
property relations is not Chinese but borrowed from Continental civil law.
Sometimes the concepts borrowed from a description of bourgeois property
rights, such as possession and usufruct, do not fit the socialist ideal of
property relations, but Chinese theorists apply them notwithstanding.
Perhaps Pashukanis was right to say that there are no socialist legal forms
because law is by definition bourgeois.
The General Principles must also be understood in the context of economic
reform in China today. As a fundamental law regulating property relations it
has an important role to play in defining the framework of property rights for
commercial relations. Yet the theory which is needed to justify and explain
these property rights is still the subject of controversy. The lack of a sound
theoretical basis for futher legislation to implement economic reform,
however, is itself an obstacle to reform. This is illustrated in Part IV of the
article which examines in detail the theoretical controversy about the
definition of property rights in the state enterprise which affected the drafting
of the General Principles and which continues today.
Chinese theories defining the property relations between the state and the
state enterprise are examined in four general categories. Theoretical and
ideological influences on them are traced, especially to Eastern Bloc
countries, and in turn their influence on the drafting process is examined. By
and large the theorists have similar ends in mind, i.e., the realization of some
degree of economic autonomy for state enterprises to control and deal with
their property efficiently and responsibly as their own, with state interference
limited to the use of macroeconomic measures. Every school of thought has
its own theoretical view of the property rights which define this autonomy.
Article 82 of the General Principles represents only one such view and it may
well be replaced in the future. Until there is a settled definition, however, it
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will be difficult for a systematic reform of the state-owned industrial sector to
take place.
I
INTRODUCTION
A common lawyer once remarked that the codification of law in civil law
systems was either the consequence of revolution or the function of
consolidation.' The drafting of a civil code in the People's Republic of China
began in the early 1950's. When the first major draft appeared in 1957 it
could have been described as revolutionary, at least in the Chinese context,
but despite several revisions it never became law. Still, the draft code and the
theoretical mold whence it sprang served both as a basis for studying and
teaching civil law as well as a springboard for judicial practice.2
China had no civil code in place when in 1978 it began to unveil its new
economic policies in agriculture and in 1984 in the secondary and tertiary
sectors. There were principles of civil law borrowed from other countries and
adapted by Chinese theorists but these principles had no legal basis or agreed
upon theoretical framework. Therefore, despite their commitment to the role
of law in implementing these new economic policies, China's reformers
worked without a civil law, arguably the most fundamental law governing
economic relationships, and without the settled theoretical framework which
should accompany it. In some ways this was a blessing in disguise because
without a rigid legal and theoretical framework, China's reformers, unlike
those in some Eastern Bloc countries, have been able to develop more varied
and inventive economic forms. In fact, a theoretical basis for action is also of
criticial importance to China's leadership, which has become heavily reliant
on ideology to mold all manner of social activity. Without it, China's reform
policies are difficult to implement and vulnerable to attack. 3
1. F. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW (1953).
2. The most systematic surviving textbook on Chinese civil law from this period is
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF CIVIL LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA by the Civil Law
Teaching and Research Section of the Central School for Politico-Legal Cadres, Law Press, Beijing,
1958 [hereinafter FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF CIVIL LAW]. An English translation of parts of this
work is available from Joint Publications Research Service Washington, JPRS No. 4879. This
translation was not available to the present writer and here all references are to the original Chinese
work.
3. What are the reasons behind the failure of China's economic reform? There are several:
1) The absence of a sophisticated and comprehensive theoretical foundation. The economic reforms had
already been launched in full scale. How would they change China? Nobody had a clear picture.
They simply improvised as they went along. [T]he reformists . . . say China's reforms did not
have precedents that could act as models. Thus there was no other way than to go about the
reforming in a muddleheaded manner. Another excuse was that a sound policy is based upon
practical experience; in order to formulate cohesive policies, it is necessary first to have the
experience. Thus it is impossible first to draw up a theoretical framework for the
implementation of reforms.
Zhang Gang, How and Why is Economic Reform Failing, CHINA SPRING DIGEST, May/June (1987) (Zhang
is a local government official engaged in urban economic reform). This may not represent a
mainstream view, but I believe it is indicative of the ideological uncertainty facing, in particular,
educated progressives in China today. This is underscored by the important ideological innovation
which emerged from the Thirteenth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party in October 1987. That is, China is only in the "primary stage" of socialism and will
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To a Marxist, property rights are the most fundamental legal expression of
the system of ownership which determines the economic infrastructure of any
society. In a socialist country, property rights, above all, must be properly
defined to reflect the radical transition from a system of bourgeois private
ownership to the system of state and collective public ownership. As the
relations of production change, so too must the law respond by reallocating
property rights to new economic entities. Thus, some of the property rights
defined in chapter 5, section 1, of the General Principles 4 are in direct response
to policies of economic reform designed to tap new productive forces in the
post-Mao era.
Nevertheless, claims that the General Principles is a "civil law with Chinese
characteristics" are prone to exaggeration. 5  In some arguably more
fundamental respects Chinese legal theorists and the drafters of the General
Principles have shown themselves to be unimaginative and unwilling or unable
to cast off the yoke of Soviet legal doctrine and rigid civil law concepts of the
Pandectist School. 6 Instead of revolution, drafting the General Principles
became a process for the rediscovery and exploration of traditional civil law
institutions. Yet the product is not a conceptually complete and sophisticated
neo-classical legal sculpture such as the German Civil Code ("BGB") which
can be admired by the trained legal expert for its precision and rigor of
thought.
More than sixty years ago, Pashukanis expressed the view that law is
essentially a bourgeois institution and that there are no socialist legal forms. 7
Debate about the class nature of law has continued in the People's Republic of
China and today theorists still argue about the ability of a socialist legal
system to inherit or borrow bourgeois legal forms. 8 The current and
remain there until at least the middle of the next century. According to the former Party General
Secretary, Zhao Ziyang, this explains why China cannot leapfrog from a backward economy straight
to a stage of socialism with "highly developed productive forces." Nor is it necessary for China to
pass through a stage of capitalism, but the via media he thereby seems to suggest is that China has a
socialist economy which borrows some capitalist techniques. See People's Daily, Oct. 27, 1987, at 1.
4. Adopted at the Fourth Session of the Sixth National People's Congress on Apr. 12, 1986
[hereinafter General Principles].
5. See, e.g., Shang Ping, Chinese Characteristics of the 'General Principles of Civil Law', Economic
Daily, Apr. 19, 1986; WangJiafu, General Principles of Civil Law which have Chinese Characteristics, 3 FAXUE
YANJIU (STUDIES IN LAw) 7 (1983) (such newspaper reports and even journal articles acclaiming the
"Chinese characteristics" of the General Principles proliferated at the time of its promulgation).
6. The nineteenth-century Pandectist School consisted mainly of German legal theorists
committed to the systematic study of Roman law who "contributed much to the technical
sophistication of the BGB" as well as the conceptual jurisprudence of modern European civil law. It
was born of the German Historical School of Law, the leading figure of which was Friedrich Carl von
Savigny. See K. ZWEIGERT & H. KOETZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 133-143, 141 (T.
Weir trans. 1977), and P. STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION 56-65 (1980).
7. E. PASHUKANIS, LAW AND MARXISM: A GENERAL THEORY (1924) (B. Einhorn trans. 1978).
8. On Chinese views in the 1950's about the critical inheritance of bourgeois legal form, see
Muenzel, Chinese Thoughts on the Heritability of Law: Translations, 6 REV. SOCIALIST L. 275 (1980). For
contemporary views, see, for example, Guo, Discussion of the Critical Inheritance of Old Law, 2 FAXUE
JIKAN (LAW Q.) 6 (1982).
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"official" view supports the critical inheritance of law, 9 and in practice
Chinese legal theorists study closely and borrow freely the analytical tools of
their bourgeois predecessors. The first object of this article is to outline the
theoretical system and thus to show how Chinese legal theorists have clung to
the analytical tools of bourgeois civil law and have tried with some ingenuity
to use them to define ideal socialist legal relationships.
One policy crucial to economic reform in the industrial sector is to make
the state enterprise an autonomous economic entity. That is, by defining the
property relations between state and state enterprise Chinese reformers hope
to separate the state's powers of ownership in state property from the
enterprise's own powers to use that property to engage independently in
economic activities without state interference. The second object of this
article is thus closely related to the first, because I will examine how Chinese
jurists have attempted to find a property rights theory to explain the
separation of ownership from the use of state property and thus to justify
enterprise autonomy. They have used theoretical tools borrowed from a
number of sources, and I will attempt to trace these sources and follow the
theoretical debate through the drafting process into article 82 of the General
Principles, where the property relations between state and enterprise are
ultimately defined.
There are, of course, many more theoretical controversies which emerged
during the drafting of the General Principles 10 but these are too many to be
included here. Since the purpose of this article is to demonstrate how
Chinese theorists hampered themselves by borrowing theoretical tools, it will
focus solely on two major issues. Throughout the discussion of these issues,
an attempt will be made to integrate the drafting process with theoretical
discussions of these or similar issues in published sources. Thus, one may
trace the central controversy from various provisions of the drafts of the
General Principles into earlier or current scholarly sources or vice versa. In
some cases it is not possible to find a direct link between a published view and
a given provision of the code; the General Principles was drafted in less than
eighteen months, so there was not always enough time for published debate.
The issue of property rights in the state enterprise has been chosen for its
theoretical and controversial qualities, which have not been settled by the
drafting process alone. The controversy will be settled by future theoretical
debate if it is ever settled at all.
9. GREAT CHINESE ENCYCLOPEDIA (LAw) 516 (1984) ("The abrogation of old law and the critical
inheritance of [positive and appropriate elements of] old law are the dialectic produced by socialist
law.").
10. One writer identified a total of nine subjects of theoretical debate towards the end of the
drafting process: (1) the scope of application of civil law; (2) the basic principles of civil law; (3)
subjects of civil law; (4) legal persons; (5) rights of ownership and operational autonomy; (6)
operation rights; (7) intellectual property rights; (8) periods of limitation; and (9) the relationship of
economic law and civil law. See YANG SU, 1 STUDIES IN LAw 39 (1986). To this list we could add
conflicts of law and innumerable questions about contractual and delictal obligations.
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II
SYSTEM OF PROPERTY RIGHTS: INTRODUCTION
According to Marxist theory, every social epoch is characterized by an
economic system of which the most basic feature is a system of ownership.
Ownership of property is in turn defined by laws for the protection of
property rights. The system of ownership may be defined in a state
constitution"' or protected by the criminal law. More commonly, however,
property rights are most carefully defined and closely regulated by civil and
commercial law.
Systematic public ownership of the means of production is the
fundamental goal common to all socialist states. In the process of
expropriating private owners of productive wealth, however, every socialist
state has encountered theoretical problems in legally defining the new
property relations thus created. The primary difficulty arises from the use of
pre-existing legal concepts which once protected private property but are now
applied to public ownership. A major part of this problem is the theoretical
and practical difficulty of creating enterprise autonomy, i.e., a system of
socialist commerce in which economically independent enterprises can make
responsible business decisions while the means of production remains
publicly owned. Our task is to discuss both parts of this problem, first by
examining how public property rights are accommodated by traditional civil
law concepts in the General Principles, and second by focusing on theoretical
debate about the nature of property rights in the state enterprise.
Roman law distinguished between ownership (dominium) and property
rights less than ownership, such as various forms of possession, servitudes,
and usufruct.i 2 Such distinctions were functional, however, and it was the
French Civil Code and then later, more completely, the Buergerliches
Gesetzbuch ("BGB") which adopted a formal classification of property
rights. 13 At this point a common lawyer may want some explanation of this
civil law system of classification. Put crudely, civil law regulates status (that is
to say, the ability to engage in civil activities) and property relations. The
latter include all kinds of property rights whether relative, arising by virtue of
obligations in contract, tort, or some other conduct between persons, or
absolute, arising by virtue of some legally recognized form of domination over
a thing.
11. This is most often the case in socialist countries where the state constitution is at first a
revolutionary document; see, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 6 (1982);
CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, art. 6 (1963).
12. See P. STEIN, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 144-72
(1984).
13. THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE, as amended to July 1976, Bk. 2, Property and Different Types of
Ownership at 129 U. Crabb trans.); THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE, as amended to Jan. 1975, at 143 (I.
Forrester trans.).
[Vol. 52: No. 2
THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
"Rights in things" are distinguished from other property rights by two
important features.' 4 First, "rights in things" confer rights on a particular
person (e.g., an owner, possessor, mortgagee, and so on) rather than a class
of persons (e.g., creditors in a bankruptcy or victims of a tort). The object of
the right is a "thing," that is, physical property, normally classified as
immovables (i.e., land and fixtures) and movables (i.e., goods), but not
intellectual property or property rights which arise from the conduct of
another person (e.g., a debt or action in tort). In other words, the law over
things regulates the relationships between persons and things while the law of
obligations regulates the relationships between persons inter se. The closest
approximation in the common law is the distinction between "real" rights and
"choses in action."
Second, "rights in things" allow the domination of a thing to the exclusion
of the rest of the world. This is because the right inheres in the thing itself
without the need for any legally recognized relationship between persons like
that existing between parties to a contract or between the tortfeasor and his
victim. For the same reason, the holder of such a right has a remedy against
the thing itself, not merely an action in damages. The last distinction will be
most familiar to those schooled in the common law with its history rooted in
the forms of actions.
The BGB had a profound effect on the drafting of the 1896 Japanese Civil
Code,' 5 and it was largely through Japan that the Civil Code of the Republic
of China, published between 1929 and 1931, acquired its terminology for the
classification of property rights. 16  Like its German and Japanese
counterparts, Book 3 of the Republican Code is entitled "Rights in Things"
(wuquan),17 and deals with ownership, possession, hereditaments, servitudes,
liens, the right to water fees, charge and mortgage, as well as related matters
such as joint ownership and registration of rights.' 8 As any civil lawyer would
14. On this topic see generally GREAT CHINESE ENCYCLOPEDIA (LAW) 628 (1984); V.
RIASANOVSKY, CHINESE CIVIL LAW 186 (1938) (reprinted by University Publications of America 1976);
1 E. COHN, MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW 170 (2d ed. 1968).
15. "[F]ew doubt today that the [Japanese] Civil Code of 1896 is not a carbon copy of the
German code." Noda, Comparative Jurisprudence inJapan." Its Past and Present, in THE JAPANESE LEGAL
SYSTEM 209 (H. Tanaka ed. 1976).
16. The facility of Chinese scholars to study Western materials in Japanese rather than in the
original language is still well recognized today. Thus, it was a combination of the experience of
Chinese students in Japan and Japanese legal experts in China which influenced the theory and
drafting of, first, the reformist codes of the late Qing Dynasty and, then, the codes of the Republic of
China. See Henderson, Japanese Influences on Communist Chinese Legal Language, in CONTEMPORARY
CHINESE LAW: RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 158 (J. Cohen ed. 1970). On the origins of
the Civil Code of the Republic of China, see also Sheng, The Civil Code of China, 4 CHINESE L. REV. 69
(No. 4 1930); Cheng, Recent Legislation in China 4 CHINESE L. REV. 117 (No. 5 1930).
17. The German term is "Sachenrecht," BGB Bk. 3, supra note 13, and the Japanese term is
"bukken," Bk. 2 Japanese Civil Law, in HIRAGANA SHOROPPO (COLLECTION OF SIX LEGAL CODES OF
JAPAN) 75 (Ito Akira ed. 1987); THE CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN 31 (1984).
18. Civil Low and Related Legislation, in ZUIXIN LIUFA QUANSHU (LATEST COMPLETE BOOK OF SIX
CODES) 158-66 (as amended to Sept. 1986) (Baichuen T'ao ed.) (in Chinese).
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appreciate, these are rights in the things themselves and not merely actions,
which are relegated to the category of "obligations" (zhai).19
Instead of the familiar civilian division between "things" (viz., property
rights) and "actions" (obligations), drafters of the General Principles adopted an
unusual distinction between "civil rights" and "civil liability." The seeds for
this novel system of classification appear in the fourth draft of the civil code,
which divided the law of obligations into contract and other "civil liability."-20
The early "draft for comments" of the General Principles first used the new
classification, and it remained unchanged throughout the drafting process. 2 1
There are four categories of civil rights: (1) "ownership and property rights
related to ownership;" (2) "obligations;" (3) "intellectual property rights;"
and (4) "personal rights."
III
SYSTEM OF PROPERTY RIGHTS:
OWNERSHIP AND PROPERTY RIGHTS RELATED TO
OWNERSHIP
At first glance, the classification of "rights in things" is conspicuously
absent from the General Principles. But closer examination reveals signs that
the theoretical concept is still hard at work. Indeed, despite earlier attempts
to abandon it, Chinese legal theorists are still bound to the concept of "rights
in things" and in some cases are even creating new types of real rights.
A. Ownership of Property
The early systematic exposition of Chinese socialist civil law rejected 22 the
concept of "rights in things" (wuquan) in favor of a concept of ownership of
property divided into three constituent "powers and functions" (quanneng):
possession (zhanyou), use (shiyong), and disposition (chufen). 23  A fourth
constituent was added to the textbooks recently: "the right to benefit"
19. Id. Bk. 2.
20. The fourth draft of the PRC civil code was circulated in 1982. An English translation
appears inJones, 10 REV. SOCIALIST L. 193 (1984). For an introduction to the drafting history of the
General Principles and its relationship to the draft civil code, see Epstein, The Evolution of China s General
Principles of Civil Law, 34 AM. J. COMp. L. 705 (1986).
21. The "draft for comments" is dated Aug. 15, 1985. For an understanding of its place in the
drafting process see Epstein, supra note 20, at 711.
22. "[Tlhe Guomindang law on rights in things is a reproduction of the reactionary civil
legislation of capitalist and imperialist countries, [and] at the same time preserves the old Chinese
feudal concept of rights in things." [sic] See FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF CIVIL LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 2, at 118. Until recently, civil law textbooks only discussed "things"
(wu) but not "rights in things" (wuquan), see TONG RoU, MINFA YUANLI (PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW) 124
(1st ed. 1983) [hereinafter TONG R. 1]. Now it is acceptable to discuss "rights in things," see TONG
Rou, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter TONG R. 2].
23. "Although possession, use, and disposal are the content of ownership, if one or two [of
these powers and functions] is detached from the owner or is limited [this] will certainly not mean
that the owner has thus lost ownership." FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF CIVIL LAW, supra note 2, at 124.
See also TONG R. 1, supra note 22, at 124.
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(shouyiquan).2 4 It seems from current textbook writers that possession or use
are not prerequisites to enjoying the right to benefit.2 5 This clearly allows for
the enjoyment of "unearned" income, which was anathema to civil law theory
in the late 1950's.26 All four "powers and functions" now constitute the
elements of ownership as defined in article 71 of the General Principles.2 7
These four constituent powers and functions of ownership can be distilled
from ownership individually or in combination, but even so they will not
necessarily become independent property rights. 28 Some theorists assert that
ownership is not just the sum total of these constituents; it is the overall right
to control property which can itself be reserved to an owner after the other
constituents have been separated out. 29 Why do Chinese theorists analyze
ownership in this way? The point is that by breaking ownership down into
four constituent parts theorists can build new rights with novel combinations
of the old parts. This might be described as a process of borrowing bourgeois
theoretical tools to produce new "socialist" legal concepts. 30 It is shown
below to what extent this process has been successful.
In accordance with the 1982 Constitution,3' the General Principles divides
the system of ownership into three categories: by the whole people, by
collective organizations of the working masses, and by citizens. The bulk of
the means of production is publicly owned by "collective organizations of the
working masses" 32 or by "the whole people." 33 At first glance this appears to
24. See TONG R. 2, supra note 22, at 141.
25. Id.
26. Examples of the exercise of the "right to benefit" given by the current textbook writers
include rent from the hire of private premises, id., interest from savings and eggs from chickens; see
ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO MINFA TONGZE SHIYI (EXPLANATORY NOTES ON THE GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW) (Zhou Y. ed. 1986). Compare this view with the one from the 1950's:
We can see this point [that the Guomindang system of property rights is a tool for the
exploitation of the working people] right from the provision for "rights to benefit"
(shouyiquan) in their [the Guomindang] ownership rights. Here, they ingeniously explain
away a property owner's source of [unearned] income as "statutory fruits" or "natural
fruits" and thereby the exploiting classes use their "benefit" to disguise what is really the
extraction of blood and sweat from the working people.
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF CIVIL LAW, supra note 2, at 188.
27. "Ownership means an owner's right in accordance with law to possess, use, benefit from,
and dispose of his own property." General Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China, 34 AM.
J. COMp. L. 715-43, 729 (W. Gray & H. Zheng trans. 1986), reprinted in LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1989, at 27.
28. For example, one legal theorist laments the fact that in Chinese civil law the right of
possession is not itself sufficient to support an action asserting a better right to a thing than a third
party's; such an action must be brought by its owner. See Wang Liming, Problems Concerning Possession,
the Right of Possession and Ownership, 1 FAXUE PINGLUN (LAw REV.) 15 (1986) (bimonthly journal of
Wuhan University Law Department).
29. Zhipei quan; see Wang Liming, Discussion of Commodity Ownership, 2 STUDIES IN LAW 37 (1986),
and Li Yuanzhi, Trial Discussion of Ownership's Internal Vertical and Horizontal Structure, 1 STUDIES IN LAW
51 (1986). This is the same view propounded by Wang Liming and Liu Zhaonian in the
accompanying article, The Property Rights System of the State Enterprises in China, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1989, at 19.
30. Supra note 8 and accompanying text.
31. CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Chap. 5, § 1, arts. 73-75 [hereinafter
CONST.]. This system of classification was also adopted in textbooks and the 1982 draft of the civil
code.
32. Laodong qunzhongjiti zuzhi. Id. art. 74.
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be nothing out of the ordinary in the family of socialist civil codes. Closer
examination reveals a number of important differences. For example, unlike
the Soviet codes, China's General Principles expressly permits private ownership
of the means of production "within the limits of the law." 3 4
For present purposes it is important to note that the Chinese civil law
drafters seemed to be moving away from the Soviet concept of "state
ownership," i.e., that "the state is the sole owner of state property," 35 towards
the more flexible notion of "state property" which "belongs to the whole
people."'3 6 According to the Soviet analysis, for the state to enjoy property
rights it must be a subject of civil law, which is a status usually reserved for
natural and legal persons. To be sure, Chinese theorists have consistently
accepted the theory that the state is at once the subject of both sovereign and
civil rights. 37 This was expressly provided in the fourth draft of the civil
code3 8 and can be inferred from the provisions on ownership in the first three
drafts of the General Principles.3 9 The final draft, however, replaced state
ownership (guojia suoyou) with the present concept of state property owned,
not by the state, but by the whole people. Therefore, one can argue that
because state property is owned by the whole people, the state need no longer
be viewed as a subject of civil rights at all. 40 Here was an opportunity for
theoretical creativity. With the state removed from the sphere of civil
activities, there are solid theoretical grounds on which to argue that the
property in a state production enterprise belongs to the whole people, and, as
the enterprise is the only entity with legal status to engage in economic
relations with this property, the state has no power to interfere with it.
Instead, the drafters appear to have created a distinction without a difference.
Chinese economic and legal theorists have in recent years focused their
attention on the special features of Yugoslavia's non-conformist socialist
economic system. Therefore, it cannot be a coincidence that this apparent
33. Quanmin. Id. art. 73.
34. Id. art. 75.
35. Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics, THE SOVIET LEGAL
SYSTEM 400, art. 21 (W. Butler trans. 1978).
36. See CONST., art. 73. Art. 7 of the 1982 Constitution merely provides for the public economy
as "ownership of the whole people economy." The third major feature of the system of ownership
expressed in the Chinese code is the collective ownership of land. Id. art. 74(1).
37. See FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF CIVIL LAW, supra note 2, at 172; TONG R. 2, supra note 22, at
34, 159; or for a more recent exposition, see two works by ProfessorJiang Ping, a Soviet trained civil
law specialist who graduated from the Law Faculty, University of Moscow, in 1956: MINFA
JIAOCHENG (TEXTBOOK OF CIVIL LAW) 50-51 and MINFA TONGZEJIANGHUA (LECTURES ON THE GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW) 129-131 (1986).
38. "The state is a special subject of civil law when it represents the interests of the whole
people when engaging in civil activities." CHINESE CIVIL CODE, Bk. 2, Chap. 4, art. 46.
39. These drafts consistently referred to "state ownership," sometimes of various objects, as in
article 72 of the third draft which provided seven objects of "state-owned" property, including all
manner of enterprises.
40. Except in the rarest of cases, for example, where the state inherits property for lack of any
entitled heir. See Inheritance Law of the PRC, art. 32, in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO FAGUI
HUIBIAN (COLLECTION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PRC) (1985).
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departure from the Soviet view reflects the influence of the Yugoslavian
concept of "social property."
The essence of social property may best be explained in negative terms, that is, that it
is neither state, nor private, nor personal property.
4 1
Yugoslav writers claim that this view is a positive step away from state
property because it precludes any person or entity (including the state) from
monopolizing the means of production and thereby prevents exploitation,
which occurs when the surplus value of the workers' labor is alienated by a
third person. 42 This may be attractive as a political ideal, but as a legal
concept it is confusing because, according to the popular view, "social
property" cannot be owned by anyone at all. 4 3 It belongs exclusively to
society for the use of the workers who thereby retain control over the
products of their own labor. The transition from state to social property in
Yugoslavia was accompanied by economic liberalization, the purpose of which
was to allow the workers in "economic" enterprises a measure of self-
government. 4 4  The idea is therefore potentially attractive to Chinese
economic reformers who have similar goals in mind. However, as outlined
below, in the quest to expand enterprise autonomy Chinese legal theorists
have largely upheld Soviet doctrine.
B. Property Rights Related to Ownership
Having thus vested ownership of most productive wealth in state and
collective entities, many of which do not even have an economic function, four
articles of section 1 are devoted to a system of legally separating out the rights
and functions of property ownership and distributing them to economically
productive entities such as state and collective enterprises, and even
individual farmers or entrepreneurs. Even if only the bare bones 45 of a
system of rights in things, this part demonstrates the debt the drafters owe to
the German theoretical system.
1. Drafting History. The "draft for comments," which was a product of some
theoretical but mainly practical input, provided compendiously for the legal
protection of all kinds of civil rights, including the right to use property
(shiyong quan), the right to use land according to a contract (chengbao quan), the
41. A. CHLOROS, YUGOSLAV CIVIL LAW 161 (1970).
42. YUGOSLAVIAN ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF LAW 3-17 (L. Huang Chinese trans. 1979
ed.[ 1984]).
43. Id. at 14.
44. A. CHLOROS, supra note 41, at 163.
45. Section 1 reflects only the very basic property relations in China's economic system. Other
rights are not included, for example, rights to use land in the course of foreign investment, which is
nevertheless the subject of separate legislation. See, e.g., Provisional Regulations for the
Administration of Land in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (1981), in ZHONGGUO SHEWAI JINGJI
FAGUI HUIBIAN (COLLECTION OF CHINA'S FOREIGN ECONOMIC LEGISLATION) (1949-1985) (1986)
(Similar legislation exists in Xiamen and Tianjin.). Nor does it protect the right to use land on which
a home has been built (zhaijidishiyongquan), which is a controversial issue, particularly among China's
increasingly wealthy peasants, and was provided for in earlier drafts. For a more complete and
traditional catalogue of "rights in things," see TONG R. 2, supra note 22, at 149-57.
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right to operate property (jingying quan), the right to create a pledge (diya
quan),46 and neighborhood rights (xianglin quan) over property. 47 In five
further articles the draft expanded on the nature of some of these rights, and
eight out of thirteen articles in this section were concerned exclusively with
real rights. The next draft was in similar but slightly expanded form and was
presented by Wang Hanbin to the Thirteenth Session of the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress on November 13, 1985. He
stressed the importance of these property rights in "meeting the needs of
economic reform." 48
The following draft, then, was a product of the deliberations of the
Thirteenth Standing Committee and a meeting of 180 legal experts. 49 The
draft adopted the existing system of classifying civil rights into four sections
although the existing content was finally settled by the National People's
Congress only after many changes were made to the first four drafts.
Therefore, while the content of the drafts was affected by both practical and
theoretical input, the system for organizing and expressing property rights
was largely a product of theoretical input, particularly by the conference of
experts held after the second draft was circulated.
2. Theoretical System. After setting out ownership rights and related matters,
section 1 enumerates five "property rights related to ownership" in articles 80
to 83. Although perhaps officially abandoned, the concept of "rights in
things" was still clearly in the minds of drafters who suggested how these five
rights should be set out and remains in the minds of writers who are now
called upon to explain them.50 They are as follows:
1. The right of state-owned or collective units "to use and benefit from" (shiyong
shouyi) land owned by the state [art. 80(1)] or things on the land owned by the state
[art. 81(1)];
2. The right, acquired by contract, of citizens or collectives to operate publicly
owned land [art. 80(2)] and things on the land (chengbaojingying quan) [art. 81(3)];
3. The right of state or collective units or citizens to exploit natural resources
(caikuangquan) [art. 81(2)];
4. The rights of an enterprise owned by the whole people (viz., a state enterprise) to
operate property given to it by the state jingying quan) [art. 82]; and
5. limitation of property rights necessary for the conduct of "neighborhood
relationships" [art. 83].
The first four of these civil rights perform an important economic function
because they create a mechanism to define, even if only sparingly, the legal
46. The pledge is included among provisions on obligations in the General Principles, even though
they give rise to real rights such as the right to sell charged property where the creditor is unpaid, see
discussion of art. 89(2), infra, at 192-93.
47. Art. 47.
48. Wang Hanbin is the Chairman of the Standing Committee's Secretariat and the Committee
for Law Building Work. China Legal News, Nov. 18, 1985, at 2.
49. See Epstein, supra note 20, at 712.
50. Two writers have even suggested that the General Principles now provides the basis for
creating a socialist system of "rights in things." See Li & Qjan, Preliminary Discussion of Our Country's
Civil Law System of Rights in Things, BEJING DAXUE XUEBAO (BEIJING UNIv. REV.) 117 (phil. ed. 1987),
reprinted in FUYIN BAOKAN ZILIAO (FAXUE) (REPRINTS OF NEWSPAPER AND JOURNAL MATERIALS (LEGAL
STUDIES)) D41, 2, 45 (1987).
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rights of productive entities to control the publicly owned means of
production. In his Theories of Surplus Value Marx showed that under capitalism
lesser property rights were separated from the ownership of capital thereby
realizing its economic function. 5 1 The division between the legal and
economic functions of ownership becomes even more important in a socialist
economic system where most of the means of production are legally owned by
non-production entities. In the People's Republic of China this division was
also recognized at an early stage; 52 but it was only in the drafting of the
General Principles that the division was crystallized into a system of property
rights recognized by the civil law. 53
A number of commentaries on the General Principles have recently
appeared, some of which are of sufficient theoretical sophistication to reveal
the thinking behind this classification of property rights. Two of them
deserve special examination.
Ownership of property is one type of most comprehensive rights in things. Apart from
this there are still many property rights ... [which] do not possess all the features and
content of ownership, but.., are still a very important type of civil rights. To protect
these property rights conscientiously ... is very important indeed in order amply to
realize the usefulness of things ....
Our country's General Principles of Civil Law have not explicitly provided for rights in
things, but the ownership rights and property rights related to ownership stipulated in
chapter 5, section 1 are essentially rights in things .... 51
The writers then go on to classify and discuss the five property rights listed
above.
First, there is the right of state and collective units to use and benefit from
land or things on the land owned by the state. In classic civil law terminology
this right is described as a usufruct (yongyiquan):56
Usufruct means that a citizen or legal person, called the usufructary, enjoys the legal
right to use and receive the benefit from the property of a third party. [T]he object of
a usufruct relationship is always non-fungible. During the usufruct relationship the
usufructary has the right to possess, use, and benefit from the thing according to law
[and] to reject interference and obstacles created by third persons. Also, the usufructary has a
51. Quoted by Lu Zhengping, Brief Discussion of the Duality of Ownership in the Property of Enterprises
Owned by the Whole People, 3 LAW Q 36, 37 (1986) (Journal of the Southwest Inst. of Politics & Law).
52. An early example of this division of property rights is an oft-cited set of regulations allowing
private individuals or cooperatives to enjoy the right to benefit from the use of uncultivated land
owned by the state. "During the [land] use period, the state safeguards the private entrepreneur's
right to use the land and enjoy lawfully earned benefits." Regulations for Overseas Chinese to Apply for the
Use of State-Owned Uncultivated Mountains and Lands, in 2 COLLECTION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF
THE PRC, art. 4(2) (July-Dec. 1955).
53. To be sure, the 1982 draft civil code contains the seeds of these property rights but not the
theoretical system; see, e.g., civil code draft arts. 48, 82, 91, supra note 20. However, the theoretical
system can now be found in the standard civil law text edited under the supervision of the Legal
Studies Editorial Board, see supra note 24. The system can also be found in textbooks on civil law
published by two leading Chinese universities: TONG RoU, INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL LAW (1982), and
WANG Z., MINFA JIAOCHENG (CIVIL LAW TEXTBOOK) (1982).
54. Hu S., MINFA TONGZEJIANGHUA (LECTURES ON THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW) 197
(1986) (emphasis added).
55. YE L., CHENGBAO JINGYINGQUAN 3 (1986) (right to operate public property under contract)
(emphasis added).
56. BGB Book 3, Chap. 5, Part 2; CIVIL CODE, Bk. 2, Chap. 3, Pt. 1, supra note 13.
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corresponding obligation to protect, manage, and use the thing properly, and to
return it when the usufruct has expired.
5 7
The relationship between the state and a socialist economic entity is thus
described in the same terms as the relationship between a private landowner
and a usufructary.
Second, there is the right, acquired by contract, of a citizen or collective to
use publicly owned land and things on the land and to enjoy the fruits. This
right is the cornerstone of China's agricultural reforms. 5 8 It has also been
described as a kind of usufruct.
The contract usufructary (chengbaoren) directly occupies [and] uses the land, forest, and
like natural resources owned by the state or collective ... and after fulfilling his duties
to meet state purchasing [targets] and pay agricultural taxes [and] make [agreed]
payments to the collective he is entitled to receive the entire benefit. Therefore, this is
a type of usufruct.
59
The contractual usufruct, as I shall call it, differs from the first type of right to
occupy and use land because the right arises from a contract between the
usufructary and the owner or occupier of the land, not by operation of law. 60
The terms of the usufruct may vary according to the agreement between the
parties, but certain rights and liabilities are present in every usufruct
regardless of the contract terms. These include the usufructary's right to
occupy and enjoy the benefits from the land without interference from the
other party but always subject to the duty to respect public ownership of the
land, environmental protection, and the relationship between himself and the
agricultural collective and third parties. 6 ' Common lawyers might call these
implied terms which the parties cannot agree to exclude, but here the terms
are contained only in the theoretical interpretation of the right, not in a
statute.
The contractual usufruct also resembles the BGB concept of a
"usufructary lease," 62 although strictly speaking no rent is payable on a
contract usufruct. Consideration for the use of the land is provided by the
usufructary in the form of a share in the fruits from the land or by payment of
use fees.63 No matter how long the contract period, the heirs and successors
of the so-called "usufructary" cannot inherit the right to continue to use the
land and enjoy its fruits. 64
57. See Hu S., supra note 54, art. 197 (emphasis added). See also the definition of a usufruct in
article 578 of the FRENCH CODE CIVIL: "Usufruct is the right to enjoy things of which another has
ownership like the owner himself, but with the substance of conserving the substance of it." J.
CRABB, supra note 13, at 138.
58. Chang, Rural Responsibility Production Contracts, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1989, at
101.
59. See YE L., supra note 55, at 4.
60. Id. at 10.
61. Id. at 31-37.
62. BGB, Bk. 2, § 7, tit. 3.
63. In substance, however, it is difficult to distinguish this type of payment from a payment in
rent.
64. See The Right to Contract Use of Land Cannot be the Subject-Matter of Inheritance, 2 FALU JIANSHE
(LEGAL CONSTRUCTION) 14. See also BGB, art. 1061, which provides that the usufruct is terminated by
(Vol. 52: No. 2
THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
The third property right, to exploit publicly owned natural resources, is
distinguished from the usufruct and defined as a "right to exploit resources"
(caikuang quan).
Although this provision has the same legislative objective as the usufruct, the object of
the right to exploit resources is completely different from the object of the usufruct;
the former is a fungible, the latter is not. [D]uring the process of exploitation [the
resources] are continuously reduced. Therefore, the state implements a system of
compensation for exploitation of mineral resources [and] has the right to levy certain
fees .... 65
In Roman law it was theoretically impossible to create a usufruct over
property which would be consumed (a fungible), but the problem was
overcome by allowing the usufructary to become the owner of the fungible
and imposing a duty to restore an equivalent amount to the original owner.6 6
This is the solution adopted in the BGB. 6 7 In Chinese civil law, however, it is
theoretically impossible for the state to lose its right of ownership in natural
resources, even after they have been removed from the ground. The surplus
fruits of the contract usufruct belong to the usufructary6 8 but mineral
resources are not fruits of the land; they are the land itself. The Chinese
theoretical position, following Soviet doctrine, has always been that state
property is inalienable. 6 9 However, by levying fees on those units or persons
exploiting state-owned mineral resources it appears the state is effectively
transferring ownership to them. Indeed, it is hard to imagine what right other
than ownership is being transferred when resources are sold to third parties.
It shall be seen later that the same theoretical dilemma arises in connection
with state property under the control of state enterprises. 70
The fifth type of property right listed above, the neighborhood right, was
conspicuously absent from the early textbooks but was later reintroduced in
the name of rights for the reasonable conduct of "neighborhood
relationships." 7 1 This type of property right was covered in some detail in the
draft civil code 72 but just one article was included in the General Principles to
cover a wide range of rights for the prevention of disputes between
neighbors. 73
In the case of immovable property, all neighbors must in accordance with the spirit of
harmony and mutual assistance, and fairness and reasonableness, and in the interests
of facilitating production, making life more convenient, and correctly conducting
neighborhood relationships such as those with respect to water supply, passage, air,
the death of the usufructary, and similarly CODE Civii., art. 617 (France), and CIVIL CODE OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 1204.
65. Hu S., supra note 54, at 199.
66. P. STEIN supra note 12, at 153.
67. BGB, art. 1067.
68. YE L., supra note 55, at 2.
69. THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 35.
70. See infra at 208-11.
71. TONG R. 1, supra note 22, at 170-76.
72. Arts. 108-21.
73. Art. 83.
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and light. A person who with respect to his neighbor causes an obstruction or damage
must cease any infringement, eliminate any obstruction, [and/or] pay damages. 7"
Such rights arising in the interest of harmonious neighborhood
relationships are property rights only in the sense that they limit the exercise
of property rights by the owner or occupier of a neighboring immovable.
They place on neighbors both positive and negative duties to avoid disrupting
each other's use and enjoyment of their own property. This is how these
rights are classified in both Japanese 7 5 and Chinese Republican 76 civil codes.
Riasanovsky argues that these rights must not be confused with servitudes. 77
The former merely limits the way a right is exercised, but the servitude creates
a new right over the property of one neighbor in favor of, and vested in, the
property of the other. This distinction, while valid in principle, is of little
practical significance 78 and becomes blurred in the following passage.
Neighborhood relationships . . .in the Japanese civil code are called "limitation of
ownership;"[ 79] in the civil code of the German Democratic Republic there is a
chapter devoted to the relationships between users of neighboring immovables.[ 80 ]
In the French "Code civil" it is provided among "servitudes or real servitudes."[ 8 1]
But whatever it is called, it means that when exercising their lawful rights the owners
or occupiers of adjoining property shall respect the other owner's or occupier's
rights.8 2
The term "neighborhood relationships" has been derived from terminology
used in the Republican Civil Code,88 which contains provisions similar to
those in the Japanese code mentioned above.
Like their equivalents in other civil law systems, neighborhood
relationships give rise to rights which, as common lawyers would put it, "run
with the land."'8 4 They are rights which arise from the need to preserve
harmony between owners or occupiers of immovable property in the exercise
of their property rights and they do not extend beyond this need.8 5
It was noted above that the General Principles does not include every kind of
real right which is recognized in Chinese legislation or legal theory. However,
chapter 5, section 1, contains all those real rights which are defined, with one
exception. Section 2 deals with obligations, and article 89(2) provides that
certain property may be offered as a pledge (diya) to secure performance of a
civil obligation. The pledge creates a real right because it entitles the obligee
74. General Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China, supra note 27.
75. Arts. 209-38.
76. Arts. 774-98.
77. V. RIASANOVSKY, supra note 14, at 210.
78. Earlier drafts of the General Principles stipulated a "neighborhood right" (xianglin quan); but
this term was later abandoned, although it remains in use in some textbooks. TONG R. 2, supra note
.22, at 192.
79. THE CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN, supra note 17, Bk. 2, Chap. 3, Sec. 1, arts. 209-38.
80. ZGB Bk. 4, Chap. 6 (East Germany).
81. Bk. 2, Chap. 4, supra note 13, at 84.
82. WANG Z., supra note 53, at 189.
83. See Bk. 3, Chap. 3, art. 833. This article incorporates the provision limiting the exercise of
ownership set out in arts. 774-798.
84. Hu S., supra note 54, at 202.
85. Id. See also BGB, arts. 1018 & 1019, which set out the concept and limitation of servitudes in
similar terms.
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to sell and realize the value of the property if the obligation is not performed.
Therefore, although the drafters did not include it among property rights in
section 1, it is clear that they also intended the pledge to be treated as a real
right.8 6 The terms pledge (diya) and pledged property (diyawu) are also used
in Book 3 of the Chinese Republican Civil Code, but only to denote a pledge
of immovable property without the transfer of possession.8 7 The usage in the
General Principles, however, appears to be applicable to any property; but it is
not clear whether the obligee must have possession of the property to realize
its value. 88
Having defined China's mixed system of ownership, chapter 5, section 1,
breaks ownership rights down into four types of property rights. These rights
are designed to ensure that economically productive entities can utilize the
means of production owned by the state or economically defunct collectives
and can thereby realize its economic value. Chinese civil law theorists call
these rights in things. Overall, despite an initial attempt to shake off the
mantle of "bourgeois" classification, clearly the General Principles remains
committed to the civil law system of property rights, influenced particularly by
the codes in those countries which have adopted the German theoretical
system.
The next section examines in detail the property rights in the state
enterprise and the theoretical debate about their definition.
IV
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE STATE ENTERPRISE
It must always be remembered that the current theoretical debate about
property rights in the state enterprise is a debate about how to define and
realize enterprise autonomy in a socialist planned economy. Enterprise
autonomy should mean that the enterprise is able not only to resist
interference from state administrative organs in its production and
commercial activities but also can use state property as responsibly as an
entrepreneur would use his own. Both aspects of enterprise autonomy
depend on the definition of the property relationship between the state, the
legal owner of all property which belongs to the whole people, and the state
enterprise, which has immediate economic control over state property. China
86. See e.g., Li & QIan, supra note 50.
87. Bk. 3, Chap. 6.
88. The only specific legislation on loan securities in China provides that both movable and
immovable property (including obligatory rights) may be pledged as security. Although actual
possession is not transferred to the obligee, the pledged property must be registered; and it is with
the authority of the registration organ that the obligee can take steps (e.g., to auction) to realize the
value of the pledged property. See Regulations for the Administration of Secured Loans in Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone (1985), in COLLECTION OF CHINA'S FOREIGN ECONOMIC LEGISLATION, supra
note 45, at 1008. For a translation and discussion of 1988 land-use legislation in Shanghai which
includes provisions on the mortgage of land-use rights and immovables, see Sobel & Zhang, The
Evolution of Foreign Secured Lending in China, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1989, at 185 & App.
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has chosen the General Principles to define this relationship; and other recent
legislation to implement enterprise autonomy hinges on this definition.89
The problem of enterprise autonomy in socialist countries has usually
arisen during periods of economic readjustment.90 Unlike the Soviet Union
and some other Eastern Bloc countries, however, China has only recently
begun to define enterprise autonomy. This is partly due to the fact that
China's new economic policy is a relative latecomer. As China departed much
earlier from the Leninist model of expropriation, more of capitalist industry
was preserved, at least until 1958, than could otherwise have been expected. 9'
A. Influences from the Soviet Bloc
Eventually, however, China adopted Stalin's model of economic
management9 2 and from this time Chinese legal theory on the rights of an
enterprise in state property, like that of many Eastern Bloc countries, 93 was
also formed in the mold of Soviet doctrine. 94 From the outset, some theorists
have argued that the state was the only proper subject capable of enjoying
ownership of property which belongs to the whole people. Therefore, despite
its sovereign status, the state was treated as the subject of civil law relations
89. See, e.g., Work Regulations for Factory Managers of Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People
(Oct. 5, 1986), 1 GUOWUYUAN GONGBAO (BULL. STATE COUNCIL) (1987) (English translation in
Summary of World Broadcasts, Far East,Jan. 21, 1987, at 1, col. l); [State-Owned] Enterprise Insolvency Law
(adopted by the 18th Session of the 6th National People's Congress, Dec. 2, 1986 (Trial), People's Daily, Dec. 3,
1986) (English translation in Summary of World Broadcasts, Far East, Dec. 6, 1986). On the system of
leasing state commercial enterprises to contract management by collectives and individuals, see State
Council Notice Approving the Report by the Ministry of Commerce on Certain Problems in the Current Reforms of the
Commercial System in Cities, in XIANXING FAGUI HUIBIAN (COLLECTION OF CURRENT LAWS AND
REGULATIONS OF THE PRC, 1949-1985), at 657, 661, 664 (finance and trade).
90. Compare the theoretical readjustment in the Soviet Union which accompanied Lenin's New
Economic Policy (1921 to 1929), the rise and subsequent purge of the Pashukanis school of
economic law in 1937, and the drafting of the "Fundamental Principles of Civil Law of the USSR and
the Union Republics," which preceded the economic reforms announced in 1965. See Hazard,
Property in the Production Enterprise, in SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 183 (J. Hazard 3d ed. 1977); W. BUTLER,
SOVIET LAW, Ch. 13 (1983); Hazard, The Abortive Codes of the Pashukanis School, in CODIFICATION IN THE
COMMUNIST WORLD 145-75 (F. Feldbrugge ed. 1975). Also in Hungary, see G. EOERSi, FUNDAMENTAL
PROBLEMS OF SOCIALIST CIVIL LAW (1970). In Yugoslavia, see A. CHLOROS, supra note 41, at Chs. 12,
13.
91. See Hazard, Property in the Production Enterprise, supra note 90, at 177. The Chinese Communist
Government officially tolerated private ownership of industry from 1950 until 1965 during which it
was transformed into part of the system of socialist ownership, although disruption in the aftermath
of economic policies associated with the "Great Leap Forward" had all but destroyed management
autonomy in enterprises by the early 1960's. Socialist transformation was accomplished in three
broad steps: first, private industry was brought under central economic management; second,
private enterprises were converted into joint state-private enterprises; and finally, capitalist
shareholders were in effect bought out by payment of fixed interest as returns on their investment.
In many cases, it appears, capitalist managers were left in charge of enterprises with a greater degree
of management autonomy than has since ever existed.
92. See infra at 818-20.
93. See G. EOERSI, supra note 90.
94. Two Chinese writers have traced the Soviet influence to a work by A. VENEDIKTOV,
OWNERSHIP IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES (1948); see Wang Liming & Li Shinong, A Discussion of the Question
of State Ownership [and] Enterprises Owned by the Whole People, 1 ZHONGGUO SHEHUI KEXUE (CHINA'S
SOCIAL SCIENCES) 3 (1986), also reprinted in 3 FUYIN BAOKAN ZILIAO (FAXUE) (REPRINTS OF NEWSPAPER
AND JOURNAL MATERIALS (LEGAL STUDIES)) D41, 65, 86 (1986) (translated into English in SOCIAL
SCIENCES IN CHINA, Summer 1987, at 21).
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represented by competent state organs or enterprises. This agency theory has
since been largely discredited both in China and the Soviet Bloc, but it has left
its mark on some contemporary Chinese theorists. 95
In the Soviet Bloc, the agency theory was gradually displaced by the notion
that state organs and enterprises could be made independent subjects of civil
law by a segregation of state property based on budgetary allocation.9 6 State
property thereby appropriated to state organs and enterprises would be
under their "operative management." Thus was born the concept of
"operative management," which was defined as the right to possess, use, and
dispose of state property according to law and the economic plan. This
formula has been incorporated into civil legislation in the Soviet Union and
other Eastern Bloc countries.9 7 It was at this stage of theoretical development
that China's civil law writers adopted the Soviet theory as their own.
State organs [and] state-run enterprises have an independent right of operative
management (jingying guanli quan) over state property according to law; this means:
1. State organs [and] state-run enterprises have the power according to the
provisions of state policy, laws, and decrees to control the property they manage
within the scope of their functional authority;
2. State organs [and] state-run enterprises can participate in civil intercourse in the
capacity of legal persons [and] independently assume property liability to third
parties;
3. The content of the right of operation and management is, according to the state's
intent, to exercise the powers and functions of possession, use[, and] disposition over
state property in order to fulfill the state plan. Ownership of the property is still
vested in the state. State organs and state-run enterprises certainly cannot acquire
ownership. 98
The Chinese term "right of operative management" means literally
"operation [or 'business'] management right"99 and is clearly based on the
same term developed by Soviet theorists and later used in Soviet civil
legislation. 00 The nature of this right as defined in the passage above was
reflected in draft legislation on state industrial enterprises in the same
95. See infra at 199, 205-06 and the views of Liu Xiaohai & Xu Wusheng.
96. See G. EOERSI supra note 90, at 99.
97. See SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 35; CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC, art. 94 (Gray & Stults trans. 1965); for the Hungarian Civil Code see G. EOERSI,
supra note 90, at 101, and for the relevant provision in the Czechoslovak Code of Economic Law, see
Wang & Li, supra note 94.
98. FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF CIVIL LAW, supra note 2, at 138-39 (emphasis supplied). The
similarities with Soviet theory are evident in extracts from an article titled State Ownership and the Right
to Operate andManage, which appeared in the Soviet journal 3 FAXUE (JURISPRUDENCE) (1976), and was
translated into Chinese in WAIGUO MINFA ZILIAO XUANBIAN (SELECTION OF MATERIALS ON FOREIGN
CIVIL LAw) 272 (1983).
99. Jingyingguanli quan. Here, "business" is translated as "operation" to make clear that it is a
right intended to be enjoyed by administrative organs as well as production enterprises.
100. Wang & Li, supra note 94. See also FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LEGISLATION OF THE
USSR AND UNION REPUBLICS, supra note 35 (art. 21); CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC, supra note 97 (art. 94). The Chinese translation of the Soviet term is usually the
same, jingying guanli, but has also been translated as "actual management"(shiji gua ni). See SULIAN
MINFA GANGYAO HE MINSHI SUSONG GANGYAO (FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LEGISLATION AND
CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE USSR AND UNION REPUBLICS) 12 (Law Research Institute Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences trans. 1963).
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period. 0 1 How far these restrictive theories determined the basis for
Stalinist-style industrial management in China before economic reforms
began in the secondary and tertiary sector in 1979 is unclear, but the
shortcomings of this management system are now well documented.10 2
First, state enterprises had little effective control over their working
capital. Capital assets were allocated to enterprises gratuitously and could be
reallocated without redress. 10 3 Enterprises contributed to depreciation funds
for the renewal of capital assets, but these funds were also controlled by the
state. Moreover, enterprises paid a large part of their net profits over to the
state. Therefore, an enterprise had no means to acquire new working capital
other than to negotiate the bureaucratic hierarchy and apply for an
investment allocation which might not be approved in a reasonable time, if at
all. As a result, most enterprises jealously guarded even their idle capital
assets lest they be reallocated to another enterprise. This caused vast waste
and inefficiency.
Second, enterprises operated under a strict production plan. Under the
unified system of supply and marketing, goods were produced with materials
supplied according to a plan and marketed according to another plan. Supply
and marketing took place by means of so-called economic contracts, but the
administrative constraints on the bargaining power of the parties were so
severe that it was doubtful whether these agreements could be called
contracts at all. 10 4 Moreover, all this took place under rigid, and frequently
irrational, price control. Finally, enterprise production management was
divorced from economic performance because there were neither material
incentives for good management nor disincentives for poor management; the
state was liable for any enterprise losses.
The problems China's reformers are trying to solve today are the same
ones Hungary faced in the 1960's.105 Hungarian theorists sought to replace
the concept of the "right of operative management" with the right of economic
autonomy of the enterprise. The latter was meant to define in much more
generous terms the relationship of an enterprise to its state-allocated
property. One Hungarian theorist wrote:
The relationship between the independent assets of the enterprises and their
economic autonomy is the same as between property and ownership. In this consists the
101. "[T]he state industrial enterprise is also an independent production and business unit with
the right to keep independent economic accounts according to state regulations. It takes full
responsibility for fixed and floating assets given to it by the state and may not sell them off or transfer
them without the approval of state administrative organs. It has the right to use fixed and floating
assets given to it by the state to carry on production according to the state plan." State Industrial
Enterprises Work Regulations (Draft) 1961 (art. 1), in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO GONGYE OIYE FAGUI
XUANBIAN (SELECTION OF LEGISLATION OF THE PRC ON INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES) 46 (1981).
102. See, e.g., XUE M., CHINA'S SOCIALIST ECONOMY (2d ed. 1986) Ch. 8; Decision of the CCCPC on
Reform of the Economic Structure, China Daily, Oct. 23, 1984, at 1.
103. TONG R. 1, supra note 22, at 139.
104. Pfeffer, The Institution of Contracts in the Chinese People's Republic (pts. I & 2), 14 CHINA Q 153
(1963), 15 CHINA Q. 115 (1963).
105. G. EOERSI, supra note 90, at 101.
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subjective civil-law status of an enterprise. In reality, the enterprise may act in the same way
as an owner .... 106
The idea that state-owned enterprises have the "right to operative
management autonomy" (jingying guanli zizhu quan) was adopted in Chinese
legislation for the first time in 1979.107 It was entrenched in the 1982
Constitution, 10 8 and it is still accepted doctrine. 10 9
In the first half of this decade there was no clear theoretical basis for the
legislative innovations' 10 which over time have given state enterprises more
power over their fixed and floating assets. While Hungarian theorists
introduced the concept of enterprise autonomy to replace the "operative
management right," in China, theorists and legislators have continued to use
both concepts, sometimes combining them. I' Yet, Chinese theoretical works
have not clearly defined the relationship between these two concepts, and not
all theorists agree that they are synonymous.' 12
There is still debate in theoretical works as there was in the drafting of the
General Principles itself about such questions as: Is enterprise autonomy as
such a legal right at all? Or is it rather a goal which economic reforms hope to
achieve in the state industrial sector?' 13 And what legal means are needed to
achieve this goal?
B. Theoretical Innovation
In surveying more than thirty recent Chinese theoretical discussions on
property rights in the state enterprise, I have identified approximately ten
different schools of thought. 14 Rather than embark on a turgid discussion of
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. See Certain Regulations Concerning the Expansion of State Industrial Operative Management Autonomy,
in COLLECTION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PRC 249 (1979).
108. Art. 16.
109. See State Council Provisional Regulations Concerning Further Expansion of State Industrial Enterprise
Autonomy, in COLLECTION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PRC 479 (1984).
110. See Wang L. & Liu Z., supra note 29.
111. See supra note 110. Some theorists have said the two terms mean the same thing, see infra at
204.
112. Cf infra at 204. The right to autonomy has also been applied to the collective economy, see
State Council Certain Provisional Policy Regulations Concerning the Collective Economy in Towns and Cities, in
COLLECTION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PRC 517 (1983) (especially art. 9).
113. "To sum up, the [state] enterprise should really become a relatively independent economic
entity, a socialist commodity producer and business entity carrying on business autonomously [and] being
responsible for its own profits and losses .... (emphasis added). Decision of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China on Reform of the Economic Structure, in I GONGYE QIYE GUANLI WENJIAN HUIBIAN
(COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS ON MANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES) 26 (Department of
Industrial Economics Chinese People's University ed. 1985). (The widely circulated English
translation, see supra note 102, omitted the words emphasized.)
114. These are (1) the enterprise is merely an agent of the state which is the owner of state
property, including the enterprise itself; (2) the state has absolute ownership in state property but the
enterprise also enjoys ownership of a relative kind; (3) the state has ownership of state property, and
the enterprise has ownership of the property of a legal person; (4) the state owns state property over
which the enterprise has a defined right of possession; (5) the state owns state property, and the
enterprise has the right of operative management over it; (6) the state owns state property, and the
enterprise has the rights of possession, use, benefit, and a limited right of disposal; (7) the state owns
state property, and the enterprise has commodity ownership, viz., ownership in the product of state-
owned means of production and labor; (8) the state has ultimate control or pure ownership of state
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every school of thought, however, I will divide the ten schools of thought into
three general theses. The theses are: (1) that the right of operative
management is a product of administrative or economic law; (2) that
enterprise autonomy can only be achieved by creating a new property right;
and (3) that both the state and state enterprise enjoy ownership rights. No
doubt the Chinese authors in this issue as elsewhere will all feel aggrieved by
this system of classification, but its purpose is to demonstrate the way in which
most theorists have attempted to preserve state ownership while equipping
the state enterprise with the greatest possible business autonomy. I shall also
endeavor to point out the major variations and conflicts within each class of
theory.
When working within a rigidly defined ideological framework such as
exists in China, theorists are most frequently engaged in controversy about
the means to an end rather than the end in itself. It should therefore be no
surprise that in this legal controversy all theorists start from the same
premise: Within China's system of ownership by the whole people, the state is
ultimately the owner of public property; but within that same system the state
enterprise shall enjoy autonomy to engage in economic activities. It must
therefore be equipped with defined rights over the property allocated to it by
the state or generated by its own economic activities.
1. The Theory of Operative Management Rights. As explained above, the right
of operative management is a Soviet invention intended to apply both to state
administrative organs and institutions as well as to enterprises. Today,
among Chinese and Eastern Bloc theorists, it is still controversial whether this
right is a creature of civil, economic, or administrative law. The arguments
put forward would be all too familiar to a Soviet or Hungarian jurist. The
Chinese views can be boiled down to three basic positions.
First, some economic law theorists' ' 5 argue that the right of operative
management is a product of the integration of state administrative power and
property, while the enterprise enjoys rights of possession, use, benefit, and disposition; (9) the
enterprise leases state property from the state; (10) the enterprise enjoys a real right in the property
owned by the state: the right to operate.
115. In China, legal theory concerning economic relations is divided into two broad schools of
thought: economic law theory and civil law theory. In its extreme form, the first *school of thought
denies the application of civil law principles to any production activities pursuant to state economic
planning. Such economic activities are regulated by economic law principles, which are a synthesis of
horizontal and vertical legal relations taking the place of civil law and administrative law. The scope
of civil law is thus limited to those economic relations, usually consumption rather than production,
outside the state plan.
The civil law school of thought, however, maintains the view that economic relations in a capitalist
economy and a socialist economy are both commodity relations and are therefore governed by
property relations defined by civil law. The civil law school regards economic law merely as a study
of those occasions when adminstrative law affects the application of civil law.
The tension between these two schools of thought was a major factor delaying the promulgation
of a code of civil law in China and partially explains why only a set of general principles was
ultimately adopted. The debate was inherited from early Soviet jurisprudence, and it is still a tense
one in China today. On the Soviet origins of the economic law school, see Hazard, The Abortive Codes of
the Pashukanis School, supra note 90. For an introduction to the relationship between civil and
economic law in China, see Kato, Civil and Economic Law in the PRC, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 429 (1982).
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the powers and functions of ownership in public property enjoyed by the
state. For example, a glance at any Chinese textbook on economic law will
reveal that the operative management right is a composite expression used to
describe the "material foundation" for the rights and duties of a state organ
or enterprise to complete the state plan. 16 The influence of Soviet theory on
this view is clear."t 7 One example is an article by Liu Xiaohai in a recently
published collection of essays on economic law:
The right of operative management ... is not a civil right .... [It] has been suggested
with ample consideration given to the needs of the system of state ownership and
economic planning [and] it does not rigidly adhere to traditional civil law concepts
.... [I]n a socialist system the relationship between the state and state enterprise is
that betweeen owner and branch organ, united within the system of state ownership
118
Accordingly, Liu defines the operative management right as "the
responsibility effectively to exercise the rights of possession, use, and
disposition over public property as intended and mandated by the state."' 19
In his view, it is not an independent property right at all.' 20 He believes the
problem of excessive administrative interference in enterprise activities arises
not from want of a definition of the right of operative management but from
the failure of administrative organs to respect that right. The fact that
collective enterprises enjoy ownership in their own property, Liu says, has not
rendered them immune to administrative interference.'21 His pragmatic view
may well represent the feelings of the silent majority among China's
reformers who seek to cast off the yoke of administrative interference not by
inventing new theories but by promoting entrepreneurship. 22
116. ZHONGGUO JINGJIFA JIAOCHENG (TEXTBOOK OF CHINA'S ECONOMIC LAW) 75 (Economic Law
Teaching and Research Section Law Dept., Chinese People's Univ. ed. 1985). This, civil law
theorists would surely say, is merely an obfuscation of a property right in civil law.
117. Wang & Li, supra note 94 (quoting A. VENEDIKTOV).
118. Liu Xiaohai, A Discussion of the Legal Nature of the Property Rights of Our Country's State Enterprises,
in JINGjIFA LUNWEN XUAN (SELECTION OF ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC LAW) 157, 164 (Jin S. & Bing Y. eds.
1986). Also published under same title in I FUDAN FAXUE (FUDAN LEGAL STUDIES) 139 (Fudan Univ.
Law Department eds. 1986).
119. Id. at 165. This reproduces the Soviet view: "A subject which operates and manages has the
power and ability to possess, use, and dispose of state property but at the same time these rights are
also obligations it owes to the state. For example, a state organization cannot but possess, use, and
dispose of state property; it cannot but treat state property as part of its property for the purposes of
assuming liabilities; it cannot but use state property in the process of production or using state
property according to state regulations or other measures; it cannot but dispose of state property
according to state regulations." SELECTION OF MATERIALS ON FOREIGN CIVIL LAW, supra note 98, at
278.
120. Id. at 163. This view is shared by some civil law theorists: "[Tlhe operational right in the
[state] enterprise is a product of state administrative mandate .... ." WANG L. & Guo F., THE
SECURITIZATION OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AND STATE OWNERSHIP 5 (emphasis added). The
authors kindly supplied me with the manuscript of this article, but thus far only a truncated version of
their views has been published sub nom. The Securitization of State-Owned Enterprises and the Evolution of
State Ownership, 6 ZHONGGUO QINGNIANJINGJI DAOBAO (CHINA YOUTH ECON. TRIB.) 38 (1986). See also
Jiang Ping, infra note 169 and accompanying text at 41. On the meaning of securitization (gufenhua)
in China's enterprise ownership reform, see Chao & Yang, infra note 180 and accompanying text.
121. Liu, supra note 118, at 163.
122. See Thiel & Chao, Enterpreneurship in China. Coping in a Socialist Market Economy, in J. KAO,
GLOBAL ENTERPRENEURSHIP (forthcoming).
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Second, other theorists claim the right of operative management is derived
from ownership itself.123 This might be called an early civil law theory
because unlike economic law theorists, Chinese civil law writers until recently
have claimed that the right of operative management was a civil law right
derived from the state's ownership of property. It is no coincidence that the
fourth draft of the civil code was circulated at the same time new editions of
civil law treatises were published, the first to appear since the resumption of
legal scholarship in post-Mao China. The concept of the right of operative
management can be traced to both the drafting of the civil code and the
textbooks which accompanied it.
In its first edition, China's standard work on civil law acknowledged that a
number of new theories had developed to explain the property relationships
between the state and the state enterprise. The authors rejected all of these
theories, however, because those theories tended to deny that the state was
the one and only subject of state ownership. Instead, they explained the
property rights of the state enterprise in the language that was used in the
1950's, although the term "property management right" (caichan guanli quan)
was substituted for "operative management right." 124 They emphasized that
the state enterprise's right to possess, use, and dispose of state property
derived from a state mandate and that its exercise could not exceed the scope
of this mandate or violate state plans. Furthermore, the state could use
administrative means to amend the plan and thereby adjust the enterprise's
organization or production activities. Subject to these qualifications, the
enterprise would enjoy relatively independent autonomy of operation and
management. 12 5
What is "relatively independent autonomy"? It is hard to imagine what
autonomy is left after being subject to all these limitations. Nevertheless,
theory continued to exert influence on the legislative drafting. Provisions in
the 1982 draft of the civil code are reminiscent of the early Soviet inspired
theory.
The People's Republic of China is the sole owner of all state property.
The state mandates state organs, enterprises[, and] institutions with state property
and provides the scope for the exercise of their right of operative management. 12 6
The first principle is still unquestionably official theory, but, as discussed
below, new theories of divided ownership may effectively erode the state's
traditionally unchallenged status. The second principle is further defined by
another provision:
123. Cf Wang & Li, supra note 94, at 40 (quoting the view of Hungarian jurist G. Eoersi, that the
right of management is itself one of the powers and functions of ownership).
124. TONG R. 1, supra note 22, at 134-42. See also WANG Z., supra note 53, at 142.
125. TONG R. 2, supra note 22, at 135-36. The second edition stresses macroeconomic controls as
an aspect of state ownership. See also Cheng Shou, A Tentative Discussion of the Legal Nature of Our
Country's State Industrial Enterprises' Operative Management Right in State Property, in SELECTION OF ESSAYS
ON ECONOMIC LAw, supra note 118, at 65.
126. Draft art. 48 (emphasis added).
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State organs, state-run enterprises, and institutions have the right within the scope of
the state's mandate to exercise possession, use, and disposition over state property
under their operative management. 1
27
This is the classic Soviet formulation. 28 However, from the drafts of the
General Principles, it seems that since the fourth draft of the civil code was
circulated in 1982, many civil law theorists must have reassessed the suitability
of the kind of thinking behind the traditional theory of enterprise property
rights as expressed by Liu Xiaohai above.
More recently, some civil law theorists rejected both of these views and
argued that operative management was not a civil right at all.' 2 9 The next
step, then, was the invention of new property rights to take the place of
operative management.
2. Theories About New Property Rights. Most public discussion about property
rights in the state enterprise has appeared since 1985, but it would be
inaccurate to say that no new ideas were published before the drafting of the
General Principles was imminent or in progress. One such early work was
published in the influential bimonthly Studies in Law (Faxue yangiu) in 1980.130
Its three authors are from the Chinese University of Politics and Law, and at
least one of them later participated in drafting the General Principles. '3'
These authors argued that the theory of operative management rights
could not explain the relationship between the state and state enterprises.
The state is the owner of state property but does not directly participate in
civil activities. Enterprises, on the other hand, participate in civil activities but
are not owners. This contradiction gives rise to a situation where both the
state and the enterprise must have property rights, but the enterprise's
operative management right is not a property right; it is a liability.' 32 The
enterprise owes the state a duty to operate and manage its property as
directed by the state. All property rights, according to this theory, remain in
the state. Management, as used here, means property management in the civil
law sense, but the term is too easily confused with management in the
administrative sense. The right of management, argue the authors, is more an
economic concept than a legal one, and therefore the exact attributes of this
right are not clear.
The explanation for this duality of property rights, they argue, is that
the state has ownership of the means of production and the enterprise has the right to
possess the means of production. Although the right to possession is a derivative of
ownership it is a kind of independent right in things. It is the property right enjoyed by the
enterprise. Ownership is the material foundation for the state's ultimate control over
the means of production and the right of possession is the direct basis for the
127. Draft art. 82.
128. Cf Soviet provisions (supra note 97) with the above draft provisions.
129. Wang & Li, supra note 94.
130. Jiang Ping, Kang Deguan & Tian Jianhua, The Property Relations Between the State and the State-
run Enterprise Should be the Relationship Between Owner and Possessor, 4 STUDIES IN LAw 6 (1980).
131. Prof. Jiang Ping is from the Civil Law Teaching and Research Section of the Law
Department.
132. Jiang, Kang & Tian, supra note 130, at 7.
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enterprise's ability to do business relatively independently and enjoy its own
independent benefits. 133
They trace this division between rights of ownership and possession in
economic activities back to Marx's theories of surplus value.' 3 4 Marx showed
that, under the system of feudal land tenure, the producer was not the owner
but merely had a right of possession in the land and by this means the owner
alienated the value of the producer's (possessor's) surplus labor.
Extraordinary as it may seem for latter-day Marxists to borrow from an
analysis of a feudal system of rights, the authors argue that such a division is
equally applicable to the relationship between the state and state enterprise in
China today.
This view has been criticized by economic law theorists because the use of
the concept of possession conceals the new meaning of property rights in the
state enterprise. They cite, for example, the duty the enterprise owes to the
state to use its property effectively within the scope defined by the state. 135 In
fact, the authors redefined possession and distinguished it from the
traditional civil law concept:
But here, what is called the right of possession means that subject to the owner (the
state) reserving the ultimate right of disposition, the possessor (the enterprise) enjoys
ample control over the owner's property.'
36
"Ample control over the owner's property," however, includes possession,
use, and disposition for value. 13 7 This analysis has also been taken to task by
civil law theorists because, it is argued, there is no basis in the civil law for
including any power of disposition in the right of possession. 3 8 Thus, it
would seem that this early attempt to rethink the nature of the property
relations between state and enterprise floundered because the concepts it
used were not acceptable to either economic or civil law schools of thought.
i. Usufruct. The same fate awaited another theory presented in Studies in
Law two years later.' 39 Li Kaiguo, from the Law Department at the
Southwestern Institute of Politics and Law, clearly meant to attack the view
that state enterprise property rights could be explained in terms of a theory of
divided ownership. At that time such a view was only the subject of internal
debate, but Li intended to nip it in the bud by accusing its proponents of
offending the sacred principle that state enterprise property belongs to the
133. Id. (emphasis added).
134. K. MARX, Theotics of Surplus Value, in 4 CAPITAL.
135. Liu, supra note 118, at 160-61. See also supra note 119 and accompanying text.
136. Jiang, Kang & Tian, supra note 130, at 7. The authors continued: "Therefore, the right of
possession is a type of relative ownership right or indirect ownership right." Unfortunately, this
conclusion was not further developed. However, it clearly shows the seeds of the theory of divided
ownership rights examined below.
137. Id.
138. Wang Liming, Problems Concerning Possession, the Right of Possession and Ownership, I FAXUE
PINGLUN (LAw REV.) 15 (1986) (Journal of the Law Department, Wuhan University). See also Wang &
Liu, supra note 110.
139. Li Kaiguo, A Discussion of the Nature of the Property Rights of the State Enterprise, 2 FAXUE YANJIU
(STUDIES IN LAW) 34 (1982).
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state as the sole representative of the whole people. 40 To recognize that the
state enterprise has ownership in its property would be to say that state
enterprises and collective enterprises are the same. This would seriously
weaken, if not destroy, the effect of state planning on the economy. 14 1
Instead, Li sought to explain enterprise property rights in terms of
usufruct. Usufruct (yongyi quan), he argued with reference to Roman, French,
and German civil law, is an independent right in things (wuquan), such as that
enjoyed by the enterprise in state property; and it is only out of habit that it is
continually called a "right to operate" (jingying quan). 142 This is the earliest
usage I have found of the term now used in article 82 of the General
Principles. 143 Li did not care what this right was called but was concerned that
its legal nature be correctly defined. As owner, the state can set production
goals, collect depreciation fees, recover the assets of an enterprise after its
winding up, and generally engage in planning and supervision of its economic
activities. As usufructary, the enterprise can possess, use, and dispose of state
property within production plans, but disposition of fixed assets must first be
approved by the state. The usufruct also comes with the duty to protect state
property. The advantages of usufruct, Li argued, was that it gave the state
enterprise independence in economic activities while holding it responsible
for state property and protecting the system of public ownership. 144
In many respects Li's definition of this enterprise usufruct differs little
from the concept of enterprise possession developed by the authors discussed
above or from the operative management right concept. In terms of the
application of the civil law concept of usufruct to a novel set of circumstances,
however, Li was original. Such an application, however, is fraught with
theoretical difficulties. Usufruct does not usually entitle the usufructary to
dispose of the subject matter, an essential attribute of the enterprise's power
over property entrusted to it by the state.' 45 Although Roman law, and in its
wake the BGB, developed an exception to this rule with respect to fungibles,
the result was that property disposed of by the usufructary would become his
property and he would be liable to compensate the original owner for its
value. 146 Applied to the enterprise usufruct, this would mean that when using
or disposing of fungible state property the enterprise would become the
owner and pass title as owner. Li, of course, would reject this possibility but
without any theoretical justification. 147
140. Id. at 35.
141. Id. (This is precisely the argument used by Soviet theorists cf supra note 98, at 275.) Li
Kaiguo also said that it was no answer to say that, without sole ownership, the state had
macroeconomic controls over the economy.
142. Id. at 36. Also, Li specifically refers to provisions in the 1922 RSFSR Civil Code (Ch. 2) and
the Civil Code of the Democratic Republic of Germany which create a usufruct to use state land and
buildings (Bk. 4).
143. Cf infra at 205.
144. Id. at 37-38.
145. Compare supra note 119. It is for this reason Liu Xiaohai rejects Li's view.
146. Cf supra at 191.
147. Li, supra note 139, at 36. See also Wang, supra note 110. for criticisms of this view.
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ii. Right to autonomy. As discussed above, in earlier legislation there were
traces of the Hungarian concept that enterprise autonomy is a property right
created by a budgetary allocation. This has been referred to as "the right to
operative management autonomy' ' 4 8 or simply "the right to autonomy. "149
Soviet theorists treated autonomy as an outgrowth of the right of operative
management in state property, not as a right in itself.' 50 Thus, Chinese
theorists must have been asking themselves whether operative management
autonomy was a civil right at all. As will be seen below, there is evidence to
show that some theorists thought it was, and this had a direct effect on the
drafting process. 151
Sun Xiaoping asserted that the operative management right and the right
to operative management autonomy as used in the 1982 Constitution were
two completely different concepts.152 He treated operative management as an
administrative right subject to the will of the state. However, he said that the
right to autonomy was a property right because it gave the enterprise control
over public property according to its own will and not that of the state.' 53 Jin
Tianxing, on the other hand, argued that the right of operative management
and the right to operative management autonomy were one and the same; the
latter was merely China's constitutional expression of the former.' 54 In yet
another article, two scholars from the Chinese People's University argued that
the precise definition of property rights by the civil law was the key to
enterprise autonomy, thus suggesting that autonomy was an end in itself
rather than the means to an end.' 55 Still, it remained unclear whether
enterprise autonomy was a right and, if so, what its legal nature was.
Evidence of this controversy had emerged already in the "Draft for
Comments,"' 1 56 and it came to a head in the first major revised draft of the
General Principles presented to the Thirteenth Session of the Standing
148. Jingying guanli zizhu quan, supra note 107, and accompanying text.
149. Zizhu quan, supra note 109.
150. 3 FAXUE (JURISPRUDENCE), supra note 98, at 275.
151. The evidence first became visible in the "Draft for Comments," to be discussed.
152. 4 FAXUE JIKAN (LAw Q) 29 (1985) (Journal of the Southwestern Institute of Politics and
Law).
153. Id. Further support for this position may be found in an article by Lu Zhengping, but he has
since adopted a radically different theory on enterprise property. See Preliminary Exploration of the
Features of the State Enterprise Legal Person, in SELECTION OF ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 118, at
167, 170.
154. A Discussion of Ownership of State Property, 2 ANHUI DAXUE XUEBAO (ANHUI UNIV. REV.) 74
(1986).
155. Tong Rou & Fang Liufang, Civil Law and Enterprise Autonomy, Guangming Daily, June 11,
1986, at 3.
156. Other than a general provision on civil rights which included the "right to operate," this
draft did not make a general statement on the state enterprise's property rights. In draft article 33,
however, it was provided that a state enterprise would bear civil liability from property under its
operative management. Opposition to this draft provision is clear from a drafting note: "Another
view is that after a legal person has gone bankrupt the question of what liability the investor bears is
quite complicated, e.g., what liability should the state bear for the debts of a state enterprise ... It is
very hard to make a clear provision here. It is suggested that this article be omitted. In the future it
can be provided in company law, bankruptcy, and other laws." Draft for Comments (unpubl.); see
supra notes 20, 21.
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Committee of the Sixth National People's Conference. 57 In introducing this
draft, Wang Hanbin said that the provisions on property rights were drafted
"to suit the needs of economic reform, according to the principle that
ownership, right to operate, and right to use can properly be separated [from
one another]."' 5 8 He explained the need to define and protect enterprise
autonomy in the following terms:
Now, there are some superior leading organs which arbitrarily interfere with the
autonomy of state enterprises in respect to personnel, property, materials, supply,
production, and marketing as provided by the state [by] wilfully transferring or
apportioning state enterprises' assets, material, and so on. 15 9
Draft article 57 was accordingly formulated:
State enterprises enjoy the right of operational autonomy (jingying zizhu quan), that is,
in respect to property given to the enterprise to operate and manage (they] enjoy the
rights to possession, use, lawfully obtained benefits, and disposition within the scope
mandated by the state.
The state protects the state enterprises' right to operational autonomy; no
organization or individual shall unlawfully interfere.
Here was the "right of operational autonomy" about to be elevated to the
status of a property right in civil law.
iii. Right to operate. The textbook writers could not have been pleased about
this. The second edition of the standard treatise on civil law had just been
completed. 60 Extensive revisions had been made to the text concerning state
enterprise property rights. Following the lead of the Chinese Communist
Party's Decision on Economic Reform the previous year,' 6 1 the authors had
adopted the view that while the state is the only owner of property which
belongs to the whole people, the state enterprise enjoys a right to operate
(jingying quan) state property. 16 2
Although the authors did not treat the right to operate unequivocally as a
property right, this intention seems clear from a discussion in the context of
the property relationship between state and state enterprise. 163 Moreover,
the authors now stressed that the state could use macroeconomic controls,
not merely administrative means, to exercise its ownership rights. 164 This is
an important change in emphasis which tends to show their intention to
separate clearly state and enterprise property rights and thereby realize the
object of operative management autonomy quoted from the Constitution.
157. This draft is also unpublished. For its place in the sequence of drafting evolution see
Epstein, supra note 20.
158. China Legal News, supra note 48.
159. Id..
160. TONG R. 2, supra note 22. The editorial foreword to the work is dated October, 1985.
161. It was here that the term "right of operation" was first used in an official document. "As
Marxist theory and the practice of socialism have shown, ownership can be duly separated from the
right to operate." XUE M., supra note 102, at 2.
162. TONG R. 2, supra note 22, at 163.
163. Id. at 162-166.
164. Id. at 160.
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After the right to operate had appeared in a gloss with other property
rights in the first draft of the General Principles,165 it was replaced by
operational autonomy. 166 A by-product of the tension between supporters of
the two theoretical approaches was that the question of property rights in the
state enterprise and its relation to state ownership was conspicuously absent
from the next draft, which was produced by the Thirteenth Standing
Committee and the meeting of 180 experts called by Peng Zhen. 167 The issue
was then settled in the final draft presented to the Fourth Session of the Sixth
National People's Congress. It contained a provision couched in substantially
the same terms as article 82:
The state-run (guoying) enterprise's enjoyment according to law of the right to operate
property handed it (jiao you ta) by the state for operation and management is protected
by law.
There were two obvious changes made in article 82. First, the final draft
substituted state-owned (quanmin suoyou) for state-run enterprise to make the
provision consistent with the language used in chapter 3, section 2. Second,
the word "handed" (iiaoyou) was replaced with the word "conferred" (shouyu)
probably to make clear that the state property is transferred to the state
enterprise with appropriate powers and functions.
It is not clear who first had the idea of a "right to operate" or when the
term was first invented.' 68 It appears to have been created simply by
dropping the term "management" from the original Soviet term. At least two
theorists used the terms "right to operate" and "right of operative
management" interchangeably. 69 Another has said that the two are not
interchangeable. 70 The consensus appears to be that the right to operate is a
property right of a lesser degree than ownership; however, different theorists
have used different theoretical tools to describe it.
Most interesting is the idea that the right to operate is a new kind of right
in things. This view is expressed by a number of writers, but they
nevertheless come to different conclusions about the scope of the powers and
functions enjoyed by the enterprise and the state's ability to interfere. Civil
law scholars Tong Rou and Zhou Wei suggest that the right to operate is
derived from state ownership for the purpose of realizing the economic
potential of state property.' 7 ' It is, however, neither a single attribute of
165. See supra note 156.
166. See supra at 205.
167. See Epstein, supra note 20.
168. The term seems to have been used by theorists as early as 1982; see supra note 139 and
accompanying text.
169. JIANG P., supra note 37, at 166; Li & Qan, supra note 50.
170. Xu Wusheng argues that the right to operate represents the enterprise's civil law rights over
its property in horizontal relations, while operative management is a comprehensive right including
internal vertical relations such as labor management. Probing the Property Rights of the State-Owned
Enterprise Legal Person, 2 STUDIES IN LAW 46 (1986).
171. Tong & Zhou, A Discussion of the State-Run Enterprise's Right to Operate, 3 STUDIES IN LAw 12
(1986). Tong Rou is from the Civil Law Teaching and Research Section in the Law Department of
the Chinese People's University and is the chief editor of the standard treatise on Chinese civil law
(see supra note 22); Zhou Wei is from the Department of Law at Sichuan University.
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ownership nor a form of relative ownership; it is a right in things which gives
the enterprise exclusive control over the property it operates. 72 This means
that, unlike administrative powers, no two subjects can have the right to
operate the same property. Finally, and most importantly, it means that once
state property has been transferred to an enterprise it cannot be acquired or
reallocated by the state without compensation.' 73
Strikingly, two scholars from Peking University's Law Faculty have reached
almost the opposite conclusion about its scope. While agreeing that the right
to operate (or the right of operative management) is a new type of right in
things (including possession, use, benefits, and disposition), they argue that
because the right to operate is derived from state ownership, it is wholly
determined by the state as dictated by planning and production
requirements. 74 This means that the scope of the right varies not only
according to the property transferred to the enterprise but also according to
the type of its economic activity. The more important the enterprise's
activities to the state plan, in effect, the narrower will be the scope of its right
to operate state property.' 75 It also means that the state has the power to
allocate fixed assets without compensation. ' 76
Every view taken sets out to establish a basis for some degree of state
enterprise immunity from adminstrative interference. Tong Rou and Zhou
Wei put their position most clearly, but, as is also true for others, the
traditional theoretical tools fail them. If the right to operate state property is
a right less than ownership in a thing to the exclusion of third parties, there
seems to be no explanation for the enterprise's ability to exclude the owner of
the property itself, i.e., the state. Moreover, if state administrative organs are
the arms and legs by which the state manages the economy, what theoretical
(let alone practical) justification is there to exclude their acts on behalf of the
state to dispose of or otherwise deal with state property? Without this degree
of immunity from interference, however, enterprise autonomy is meaningless.
For that very reason, some civil law theorists have already abandoned the
concept of a right to operate and have sought some firmer theoretical
foundation for enterprise autonomy.' 77 In the meantime the "right to
operate" remains the only officially recognized property right in the state
enterprise, and it is on this basis that further legislation on enterprise reform
is being drafted.17 8
172. Id. at 17.
173. Id. See also Lu Zhengping, Preliminary Investigation into the Features of Enterprises Owned by the
Whole People, in SELECTION OF ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 118, at 167, 172.
174. Li & Qan, A Discussion of the State-Owned Enterprise's Right of Operative Management, 2 STUDIES IN
LAw 32, 34 (1987).
175. Id. at 36.
176. Id. at 37. For a similar view see also DingJimin, Right to Operate and Ownership, I STUDIES IN
LAw 12 (1987).
177. See infra Part VI.
178. E.g., State-Run Enterprise Property Management Regulations, Sept. 1986 (draft for revision). Art.
4 provides, in language reminiscent of the Soviet civil codes: "The ownership of the property of the
state-run enterprise is vested in the state; the enterprise has the right to possess, use, benefit, and
dispose of [that property] within the scope provided by law and regulations."
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iv. Ownership rights. In August 1986, the Propaganda Department of the
Shanghai Branch of the Chinese Communist Party organized a meeting to
discuss the question of reforming the system of ownership in the means of
production. From a record of that meeting published in the People's Daily, it is
clear that the single most controversial issue was how to reform the system of
state ownership in the secondary and tertiary sectors. 79 Three possible
avenues for reform were identified, but it appears no consensus was reached.
First, it was suggested that the existing system could be further improved, for
example, by continuing the policy of leasing and contracting out the
management of small state enterprises. The meeting concluded, however,
that the major difficulty with this scheme was finding a mechanism to ensure
enterprise autonomy. Second, it was suggested that state ownership could be
converted into enterprise ownership. The problem here was finding a way to
use macroeconomic controls to ensure adherence to the concept of a planned
commodity economy. Finally, the third scheme was to securitize (gufenhua)
state enterprises in such a way that they would become a cooperative venture
between the state, the enterprise, and its workers. The problem here is how
to define the roles of these three different subjects. China has shown a
fascination for Western corporations and securities law. However, in spite of
legislative innovation it still lacks a solid theoretical foundation for
securitization of the state-owned sector.
The radical proposal for converting state ownership into enterprise
ownership was thus brought out into the open. Almost as soon as vigorous
theoretical debate started, 80 however, two new regional laws were adopted to
allow state, collective, and foreign-owned enterprises to issue both shares and
bonds to the public.' 8' Technically, issuing shares and carving up public
ownership between the state and enterprises are two separate issues.
Securitization has been justified, like leasing and contract management, as a
means of separating the right to operate from state ownership and the power
of intervention.1 82 However, many theoretical problems about the property
relationships between shareholders and the enterprise remain.
179. Shang Xuanli, Renmin ribao (People's Daily), Sept. 1, 1986, at 5.
180. See Li Yining, A Vision of Ownership Reform in Our Country, People's Daily, Sept. 26, 1986 (Li
advocated the securitization of large and medium-sized state enterprises.). See also Chao & Yang, The
Reform of the Chinese System of Enterprise Ownership, 1987 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 365.
181. Xiamen City Trial Measures for the Administration of Enterprise Shares and Bonds, Sept. 1, 1986,
China Econ. News, Nov. 24, 1986; Guangdong Province Provisional Measures for the Administration of Shares
and Bonds, Oct. 10, 1986, China Econ. News, Nov. 24, 1986.
182. See, e.g., Trial Scheme for the System of Enterprise Share Joint-Ownership (draft for comments)
produced by a meeting of political, theoretical, and industrial organizations in Sichuan Province,
which provides that the property of an enterprise may be owned jointly by the state, the collective of
workers in the enterprise, and individual workers as defined by shares [art. 3] and that the right to
operate this property will be vested in the organ representing the workers' collective (collective here
means the unity of workers in one enterprise). 6 JINGJITIZHI GAIGE TANSUO (EXPLORATION INTO
ECONOMIC REFORM) 10 (1986), reprinted in I FUYIN BAOKAN ZILIAO (JINGJIIFA) (REPRINTS OF NEWSPAPER
AND JOURNAL MATERIALS (ECONOMIC LAW)) D41 1, 73 (1987). See also LiJingtang, The Share System Is
An Important Form for Separating the Right to Operate from State Ownership, 2 L. REV. 15 (1987); Qiang Li,
The Share System and Enterprise Vitality, I XIBEI ZHENGFA XUEVUAN XUEBAO (Nw. INST. POL. & L. REV.) 16
(1987), reprinted id. at 63.
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Without a sound theoretical basis (not to mention macroeconomic
measures) for introducing these new laws, it should not be surprising that the
ability of state enterprises to issue shares to the public was short-lived.' 8 3 In
the meantime, legal theorists went back to the drawing board to invent new
theories to explain and justify a system of public ownership divided between
the state and state enterprises.
Two new schools of thought later crystallized from a meeting of legal
theorists organized by the Law Institute in the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences.' 8 4 The most radical view advocated abandoning the traditional
system of state ownership and replacing it with a system where enterprises
enjoy the independent ownership rights of a legal person, in effect, by
transforming state enterprises into collective enterprises. 1 5 Some published
essays come close to this point of view,' 8 6 but none go so far as to advocate
re-collectivization, which is inimical to the idea that the expansion of state
ownership represents progress in the history of China's economy since 1949.
The second school of thought advocated the division of ownership into
absolute ownership, reserved to the state, and relative ownership (or
commodity ownership) enjoyed by state enterprises. There are many
proponents of this conceptually difficult and nebulous theory. One early and
pragmatic exposition was given by a researcher at the Law Institute itself.
Liang Huixing said that recognizing the enterprise's relative ownership in its
property was the key to its autonomy. 8 7 If Sino-foreign equity joint ventures
own their property, state enterprises cannot be denied ownership of theirs.'
8 8
The state enterprise's ownership of its property is not private or collective
ownership so it cannot harm the system of public ownership.' 8 9 Besides, the
state retains macroeconomic and legal means to control the activities of state
enterprises. 90 In his pragmatism, however, Liang did not anticipate the
theoretical difficulties in his proposition. In particular, he did not explain how
one thing can have two different owners. This flaw has attracted the most
183. The State Council later issued its own regulations which prohibit state enterprises from
issuing shares to the public. See State Council Notice Concerning Strengthening the Administration of Shares
and Bonds, GUOWUYUAN GONGBAO (BULL. STATE COUNCIL), Mar. 28, 1987, at 346.
184. 2 YE L., FALUJIANSHE (LEGAL CONSTRUCTION) 46 (1987).
185. Id. The property of collective enterprises is owned by the members of the collective in
indivisible shares. The nature of collective ownership, however, is ideological not practical for the
shares in a collective enterprise are only national and cannot be transferred. Collective ownership is
a type of public ownership. Thus, collective property is public property and should not be confused
with family property or other types of private property which is co-owned.
186. Cf Liang Huixing, A Discussion of the Enterprise Legal Person and the Enterprise Legal Person's
Ownership Rights, in CERTAIN CIVIL LAW PROBLEMS IN REFORM OF THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 75 (Tong
Rou ed. 1985).
187. Id. at 84.
188. Id. at 85. Another theorist has relied on this anomaly in China's system of ownership to
show that ownership rights need not always conform with the system of ownership and that this has
also occurred in Czechoslovakia, in 1972 legislation on Czech-foreign mixed ownership companies:
Xu Ming, A Discussion of Bankruptcy and Enterprise Legal Person Ownership, I Nw. INsT. POL. & L. REV. 22
(1987), reprinted in I COLLECTION OF NEWSPAPER AND JOURNAL MATERIAL (ECONOMIC LAW) D411, 69.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 87.
Page 177: Spring 1989]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
criticism, 19 1 and since then, supporters of divided ownership have gone back
to the basics of political economy to find a theoretical justification.
Here, ideas also abound, but there are two theories which seem to
illustrate not only how Chinese theorists have gone back to Marx's analysis of
property relations in a system of private ownership in an attempt to define the
respective limits of state and enterprise ownership, but also how theoretical
development has tended to expand the scope of enterprise ownership. The
first theory, presented by a civil law teacher at the Chinese People's
University, starts from the traditional premise that only the state has
ownership in the means of production.19 2  Taking a Marxist view that
commodities are the product of combining the means of production and
labor, he concludes that the state enterprise enjoys "commodity ownership,"
i.e., ownership in the thing which has been produced by combining the state-
owned means of production with labor provided by the body of workers.19 3
Because the enterprise is an assembly of workers which contributes labor to
the process of production, it should therefore enjoy ownership in the
product. 194
By separating ownership in the means of production from commodity
ownership, the first theory explains the theoretical basis for state enterprises
to engage in commerce, but it does not justify enterprise autonomy from
administrative intervention. However, a second theory later emerged which
attempts to show that the duality of ownership Marx identified in the capitalist
system is also able to define the relationship between the state and state
enterprise in a socialist economy. 195 In his Theories of Surplus Value, Marx
showed that under capitalism, ownership had both legal and economic
expressions which could be separated from each other. According to Lu
Zhengping, this explains how in a share company the shareholders' property
is a commodity performing an economic function (viz., profit making) in the
hands of the company. 196 The company thereby acquires independent legal
personality and the legal rights to control its property. This results in a
duality of property rights, i.e., the company's right to use its property and
realize its value, and the shareholders' rights to share in the profits. 19 7 This
transformation of the company's character, he argues, was an important factor
in the rapid economic development of capitalism.
191. Tong R. & Zhou W., supra note 171.
192. Wang Liming, Discussion of Commodity Ownership, 2 STUDIES IN LAW 37, 39 (1986).
193. Id..
194. Id. This appears to give the enterprise as a legal person the ownership in the products of the
workers' labor which should belong to the workers themselves. This is precisely the kind of
exploitation which led Yugoslav theorists to the concept of "social ownership," supra at note 41 and
accompanying text.
195. Lu Zhengping, A Preliminary Discussion of the Duality of the Ownership of Property in Enterprises
Owned by the Whole People, 3 LAw Q 36 (1986).
196. Id. at 37-38. See also Li Yuanzhi, A Tentative Discussion of the Ownership's Internal Vertical and
Horizontal Structure, I STUDIES IN LAw 51 (1986).
197. Id. at 37-38.
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Lu notes that the system he describes obtains today in Western countries,
even in the state-owned sector, where the state holds all or a majority of
shares in state companies but does not directly interfere in the internal
management of the company. 98  He then asserts that in China the
relationship between the state, as investor, and the state enterprise is like that
between shareholders and a company. The enterprise has independent
control over its assets and bears sole liability for its losses. Thus, the state
must not directly interfere in the internal management of the enterprise but
can only influence the enterprise's economic activities by means of the
planning mechanism, taxation, and other macroeconomic measures. This is
really the crucial analogy Lu Zhengping wishes to draw, and it will have a
special attraction for supporters of securitization of China's state
enterprises. 199 Thus, by another route, he comes to the same conclusion as
advocates of different property rights.
Economic law theorists who deny that the state enterprise has any
property rights at all can usually be identified with supporters of economic
planning and rigorous state intervention in economic activities. Just as the
theorists are not necessarily opposed to economic reforms, advocates of
autonomous property rights in state enterprises are not necessarily opposed
to state economic planning. It is clear, however, from the theoretical
positions they have taken that each school of thought has its own view about
the extent to which state enterprises should enjoy autonomy as well as the
theoretical means to achieve it.
V
CONCLUSION
The General Principles is not just a piece of legislation; it represents a system
of legal relations, and it has an underlying theoretical framework. Despite any
special "Chinese characteristics" that might be found elsewhere in the General
Principles, its theoretical framework is firmly rooted in the Romanist law
tradition as interpreted by the Pandectists and borrowed from them by
Japanese and Chinese jurists before 1949. This is amply illustrated by the
definition of property rights in chapter 5, section 1. Although these property
rights are the product of new property relationships based on a mixed system
of public and private ownership, Chinese civil law scholars analyze them with
the same theoretical tools as their counterparts in capitalist countries. This is
one illustration of Pashukanis' thesis that law is by its definition bourgeois and
that the search for so-called socialist legal forms is fruitless. Indeed, Chinese
theorists are not disturbed that the analysis of ideal socialist property
198. Id. at 38.
199. Lu's view appears to be gaining currency among other theorists such as Wang Liming, who
has apparently modified his theory of commodity ownership, see supra note 192, to accommodate the
transformation of some state enterprises into stock equity enterprises owned in shares by the state,
enterprise employees, and members of the public, see supra note 110.
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relations with tools invented for capitalist forms is not always a comfortable
fit.
Article 82 of the General Principles broadly defines the property relations
between the state and the state enterprise, but the nature and extent of
property rights vested in the state enterprise are still the subject of theoretical
controversy. Is the "right to operate" a property right at all, or is it merely an
authority to use public property as directed by the state? Are they real rights
vested in the enterprise which can thus control state property to the exclusion
of even state administrative intervention? Or is ownership in public property
shared by the state and the enterprise? In either case, is the state thereby
deprived of the right to control enterprise property except by using
macroeconomic measures? These are all possibilities debated by theorists in
the search for a legal definition of enterprise autonomy. This lack of a clear
theoretical basis for state enterprise property rights will remain an obstacle to
reform of the state-owned industrial sector of China's economy.
VI
AFTERWORD
Research for this article was completed in the summer of 1987. Had it not
been for the democracy movement in the spring of 1989 and its violent
political aftershock, the pattern of theoretical development I have described
above would have been confirmed by the important ideological and legal
developments which followed the CCP Central Committee's annual plenum in
the fall of 1987. However, the dismissal in July 1989 of CCP General
Secretary Zhao Ziyang, former Premier and chief architect of China's program
of economic reform, has cast doubt on the future course of China's
socioeconomic development. Although the ultimate consequences of recent
political developments are far from clear, it has become necessary briefly to
reassess the direction of economic and ideological change in China as well as
its effects on past and future legal developments.
Already in 1988, the appointment of Li Peng to replace Zhao Ziyang as
China's Premier was a challenge to existing economic policy. Li, who studied
in the Soviet Union in the 1950's, is commonly associated with conservative
economic policies which favor central planning and strict administrative
control over the economy. Such policies are at odds with the economic
freedoms which arose in the 1980's and the system of property rights
designed to foster them. Although China's new leadership remains publicly
committed to foreign trade and investment policies,200 its commitment to the
relatively free domestic economy is far from clear. Soon after the political
reshuffling which took place in the wake of the Tiananmen massacre, the
policies of Zhao Ziyang and his intellectual allies were vilified in internal Party
200. Do Rosario, Banker's Acceptance, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV. 48 (Nov. 2, 1989). Facing a serious
foreign exchange shortfall for 1990, China has little choice but to continue its foreign economic
policies. Do Rosario, Foreign Accounting, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV. 56 (July 27, 1989).
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documents as well as in China's press.20' At the same time, newly emerging
economic policies signal a return to central economic management.202 A
recent crackdown on non-agricultural private enterprise, although perhaps
conceived as retribution for those entrepreneurs who gave economic anc
moral support to the democracy movement, does not bode well for the future
development of economic freedom.20 3
Before 1978, anyone who suggested a loosening of the strict adherence to
state and collective modes of production was labelled a revisionist or a
capitalist roader. Over the last decade of economic reform, as reformers
sought ways to realize economic potential by reinventing private property
rights, the CCP leadership found it necessary to put itself above such criticism
and began to nurture an ideology for the economically underdeveloped
socialist state. Although this new ideology began with a theory posited as
early as 1979,204 it was not until the Thirteenth CCP National Congress in
October 1987 that "preliminary socialism" was pronounced a part of official
ideology. In his speech to the Congress, the central ideological proclamation,
former General Secretary Zhao Ziyang explained that because socialist China
emerged from a semi-colonial, semi-feudal period without passing through a
stage of highly developed capitalism, its productive forces remained far
behind those of developed capitalist countries. 20 5 Therefore, he declared,
China would first have to go through a long period of preliminary socialism
during which time the private economy would be allowed to co-exist with the
socialist public economy. 20 6
Applied to law, the doctrine of preliminary socialism lends ideological
legitimacy to legal ideas and forms borrowed from the West, without having
the appearance of undermining socialism or the authority of the CCP. In fact,
it is clear that the influx of Western political ideals into China inspired young
Chinese intellectuals boldly to demand political changes which a majority of
China's Party elders are still not prepared to concede. Inevitably, Western
ideas will again be criticized as a cause of "bourgeois liberalization" among
Chinese intellectuals. 20 7 It is true that adverse political responses to unrest
amongst intellectuals in the past decade have been relatively short-lived and
have not deterred China's jurists from studying Western law and borrowing
201. Do Rosario, Settling Old Scores, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV. 13 (Aug. 10, 1989); Delfs, Fixing the
Line, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV. 14 (Nov. 9, 1989).
202. Do Rosario, Quick Step Back, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV. 47 (Oct. 19, 1989). An outline of the
new economic policy appeared in a secret Party document which was probably a product of the Fifth
Plenum of the CCP Central Committee in the fall of 1989. See Delfs, Power to the Party, FAR EASTERN
ECON. REV. (Dec. 7, 1989).
203. Do Rosario, To Pay Tax is Glorious, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV. 51 (Aug. 24, 1989).
204. See Su Shaozhi, XUESHU YUEKAN (ACADEMIC MoNTHLY),June 1979, at 14; Sullivan, Ideology of
the CCP Since the Third Plenum, in CHINESE MARXISM IN FLUX 1978-1984 (B. Brugger ed. 1985).
205. Advance Along a Socialist Road with Chinese Characteristics, in ZHONGGUO CONGCHANDANG DI
SHISANCI QUANGUO DIABIAO DAHUI WENJIAN HUIBIAN (Collected Documents of the 13th National
Congress of the CCP) 1 (1987).
206. Id.
207. Compare, e.g., Campus Unrest: Result of Liberalization, 8 BEIJING REV. 14 (1987) (criticism of the
student democracy movement of winter 1986).
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from it. However, just as the democracy movement of 1989 was wider and
deeper than ever before, the present political campaign will run longer and
deeper. It seems unlikely that the doctrine of preliminary socialism will
survive the 1990 CCP Congress but even if it does, China's jurists will find
little comfort in it as a blanket approval for foreign legal borrowings.
Legal changes made on the strength of preliminary socialism are therefore
threatened. In April 1988, the National People's Congress took two
important steps to give legal expression to urban economic reforms. The first
and most fundamental was to amend the 1982 Constitution expressly to
permit and protect the private economy (siyingfingii)20 8 and the lawful transfer
of the right to use land.209 Any doubt about the constitutionality of existing
laws 210 on these topics was thereby put to rest. Second, after a long gestation,
a comprehensive law was promulgated to regulate state-owned enterprises. 2 t'
The State Enterprise Law was supposed to be a crucial development in the
public economy for two reasons. First, it was supposed to define the structure
necessary to give the state enterprise its economic autonomy. Second, the
State Enterprise Insolvency Law 21 2 and the State Enterprise Law were parts of
a single reform package with the implementation of the former contingent on
the latter. 213
In fact, the State Enterprise Law is a disappointment because while the
enterprise management can in name make economic decisions more
autonomously, the exercise of this power is still ambiguously open to
interference from Party and government organs. 214 The powers of the factory
director/manager and the procedure for his/her appointment is left for
clarification by the State Council. 215 Property rights in the state enterprise
have been defined but not in detail and this makes the future of the draft State
Enterprise Property Management Regulations 21 6 uncertain. Enterprise
property rights are set out in the same terms as article 82 of the General
Principles217 "according to the principle of separation of ownership and the
208. CHINESE CONST., art. 1I.
209. Id. art 10.
210. On pre-existing legislation concerning land use rights, see Sobel & Zhang, supra note 88, at
Part VIII. On legislation regulating the individual economy, see Epstein & Ye, Individual Enterprise in
Contemporary Urban China: A Legal Analysis of Status and Regulation, 21 INTERNAT'L LAWYER 397 (1987).
On 1988 legislation regulating the private economy, see Provisional Regulations Concerning Private
Enterprises, Provisional Regulations Concerning Income Tax on Private Enterprises, Provisions Relating to the
Imposition of Individual Income Regulatory Tax on Investors in Private Enterprises, in EAST ASIAN EXECUTIVE
REPORTS (Oct. 1988); Conner, China's Provisional Regulations Governing Private Enterprises, in id.
211. Law of the PRCfor Enterprises Owned by the Whole People, People's Daily (overseas ed.), Apr. 18,
1988, at 3.
212. See supra note 89.
213. The State Enterprise Insolvency Law was designated to come into effect three months after
the State Enterprise Law was implemented, i.e., Nov. 1, 1988.
214. See CHINESE CONST., arts. 8, 55.
215. See id. art. 67, chs. 3, 4.
216. See supra note 178.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 165-69.
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right to operate." 21 8 The latter is defined as "the right of an enterprise to
possess, use, and dispose of property according to law." 2 19
Of course, this definition closely coincides with the constituents of
ownership in the General Principles, 220 except that it does not include mention
of "benefit" and adds the apparently superfluous rider that disposition of
property must be "according to law." If the rights to possess, use, and even
dispose of property, while limited to certain situations, constitute the only
benefit enjoyed by the enterprise from its property, this formulation of the
"right to operate" weakens the view that the state enterprise's property right
is a kind of usufruct. 221 Conferring on the enterprise the ultimate right of
disposition, however, suggests the right to operate is a "property right" but
qualifying disposition clearly preserves powers of administrative intervention
at the expense of enterprise autonomy. Ultimately, management autonomy
still depends on who is making the enterprise's economic decisions and in this
respect the law is still far from clear.
Even "preliminary socialism" cannot accommodate theories about the
system of ownership which go to the root of Marxist orthodoxy. Nevertheless,
radical theories about the transformation of property in state enterprises
remained, until the summer of 1989 at least, hot topics for discussion. 222
Thus, the advent of preliminary socialism made it appear that state ownership
was a waning economic significance. However, after the State Council
prohibited state enterprises from issuing shares, 223 it seemed clear that
reforming state ownership by the securitization of state enterprises was not an
immediate possibility. While the State Enterprise Law has not lifted this
prohibition, 22 4 it does seem to envisage that some state enterprises will be
owned by shares22 5 and can hold shares in other enterprises and
institutions. 2 26
Finally, the dramatic political events which took place in Eastern Europe
during the winter of 1989 will affect China's pattern of legal borrowings.
Unless China soon follows the political path of Eastern Europe, which seems
highly unlikely, the legal reforms which will inevitably accompany political
and economic change in Eastern Europe will be too radical to be an
acceptable model for China. The borrowing of legal ideas from Hungary and
East Germany will thus cease. As the economic policies of Zhao Ziyang's
China had already surpassed the Soviet Union, where political direction is also
fraught with uncertainty, China may be forced into ideological isolation. This
may force legal thinkers to look harder for indigenous solutions to China's
218. State Enterprise Law, art. 2. Any theory of relative ownership is thereby rejected.
219. Id.
220. See supra Part III.A.
221. See supra Part IV.B.2.i.
222. See Li Yining, supra note 180; Delfs, Property to the People, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV. 12 (Dec.
22, 1988).
223. See supra note 183.
224. Article 34 provides that the state enterprise may issue bonds but does not mention shares.
225. CHINESE CONST., art. 66.
226. Id. art. 34.
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legal problems. More likely, as economic management is recentralized,
economic reform in the secondary and tertiary sectors will stall and discarded
ideas will be "rediscovered" and applied to the problems of the old economic
system. Civil law, which flourished as market forces were reasserted after
1984, may now be supplanted by economic law, marking the reascendency of
the public economy.
